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SUMMARY 
This r e s e a r c h i s d e s i g n e d to ga in i n s i g h t s i n t o m u l t i - l e v e l 
d e c i s i o n p r o c e s s e s . I t i s e x p l o r a t o r y in nature and s p e c i f i c a l l y l ooks 
i n t o the e f f e c t s of the r i s k t o l e r a n c e of d e c i s i o n makers on t h i s m u l t i ­
l e v e l d e c i s i o n p r o c e s s . 
This p r o c e s s i s examined i n an R & D environment . The methodology 
used i s s i m u l a t i o n . The model used f o r the r e s e a r c h i s a network r e p r e ­
s e n t a t i o n of a l a r g e h i e r a r c h i c a l governmental o r g a n i z a t i o n . The model 
i s a funding model , hence the d e c i s i o n i n v e s t i g a t e d i s the s e l e c t i o n and 
funding o f R & D t a s k s . As used i n t h i s work, t h i s model i s s o l v e d more 
than one t ime in a s e q u e n t i a l manner. This g i v e s the model the m u l t i ­
l e v e l proper ty needed for the r e s e a r c h . 
The r e s e a r c h acknowledges t h a t the m u l t i - l e v e l d e c i s i o n p r o c e s s i s 
an e x t r e m e l y complex p r o c e s s . However, a g r e a t e r unders tanding o f t h i s 
p r o c e s s i s p o s s i b l e i n c l u d i n g two i n t e r e s t i n g i n s i g h t s . T e n t a t i v e r e ­
s u l t s i n d i c a t e t h a t a r i s k i n t o l e r a n t d e c i s i o n maker w i l l f i n d fewer 
t a s k s than w i l l h i s r i s k t o l e r a n t c o u n t e r p a r t . More i m p o r t a n t l y , i t 
appears t h a t the i m p o s i t i o n of budgetary c o n s t r a i n t s by a h i g h e r l e v e l on 
a lower l e v e l o f the o r g a n i z a t i o n need not n e c e s s a r i l y have the e f f e c t 
o f f o r c i n g the lower l e v e l to behave i n a manner more c o n s i s t e n t w i th 
t h a t o f the h i g h e r l e v e l . 
While the i n s i g h t s reached i n t h i s work are t e n t a t i v e , they do 





A h i e r a r c h i c a l or m u l t i - l e v e l o r g a n i z a t i o n i s ex tremely complex. 
The d e c i s i o n p r o c e s s e s o c c u r r i n g w i t h i n such an o r g a n i z a t i o n are a l s o 
complex. T r a d i t i o n a l l y , management s c i e n t i s t s have taken two avenues o f 
approach when s t u d y i n g d e c i s i o n p r o c e s s e s i n m u l t i - l e v e l o r g a n i z a t i o n s . 
One approach has been to study i n d i v i d u a l d e c i s i o n making and d e c i s i o n 
p r o c e s s e s [12] and the o t h e r has been to study the o r g a n i z a t i o n a l and b e ­
h a v i o r a l a s p e c t s o f the sys tem [ 2 4 , 2 5 , 3 3 ] . Each o f t h e s e approaches has 
l e d to a r e l a t i v e l y s e p a r a t e and w e l l - d e f i n e d body of knowledge. However, 
t h e s e two approaches and the s e p a r a t e b o d i e s of knowledge r e s u l t i n g from 
t h e i r u s e , have not begun to c o n s i d e r m u l t i - l e v e l d e c i s i o n p r o c e s s e s in 
d e p t h . 
The m u l t i - l e v e l d e c i s i o n p r o c e s s and the e f f e c t s of some o f the 
d e c i s i o n v a r i a b l e s on the outcomes of t h i s p r o c e s s are the s u b j e c t s of 
t h i s s t u d y . This w i l l i n v o l v e the use of e l e m e n t s from both d e c i s i o n 
theory and o r g a n i z a t i o n t h e o r y . The environment used for t h i s study w i l l 
be t h a t o f a r e s e a r c h and development (R & D) o r g a n i z a t i o n . This e n v i r o n ­
ment was chosen because such o r g a n i z a t i o n s and the d e c i s i o n p r o c e s s e s 
which occur t h e r e i n have been r e l a t i v e l y w e l l r e s e a r c h e d and are r e l a ­
t i v e l y w e l l unders tood compared to o t h e r o r g a n i z a t i o n a l env ironments . 
Management s c i e n t i s t s have in the r e c e n t pas t devoted much time and 
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thought to s t u d y i n g , h y p o t h e s i z i n g , and model ing R & D d e c i s i o n s [ l , 3 , 6 , 
37] . This d e f i n i t i o n and unders tanding o f the R & D d e c i s i o n p r o c e s s and 
the f a c t t h a t many R & D d e c i s i o n s occur w i t h i n the framework of a m u l t i ­
l e v e l o r g a n i z a t i o n make t h i s environment an i d e a l one i n which to work 
and the d e c i s i o n p r o c e s s e s e x c e l l e n t ones to s t u d y . 
General Statement o f the Research Quest ion 
The o b j e c t o f t h i s t h e s i s i s t o s tudy the impact o f a d e c i s i o n 
maker's r i s k t o l e r a n c e on the m u l t i - l e v e l R & D d e c i s i o n p r o c e s s i n h i e r ­
a r c h i c a l o r g a n i z a t i o n s . The primary R & D d e c i s i o n t o be s t u d i e d w i l l 
be t h a t o f p r o j e c t s e l e c t i o n and a l l o c a t i o n o f a s c a r c e r e s o u r c e to those 
s e l e c t e d p r o j e c t s . The s c a r c e r e s o u r c e c o n s i d e r e d in t h i s s tudy i s 
budgetary d o l l a r s . In e f f e c t , t h i s makes the d e c i s i o n p r o c e s s under study 
a c a p i t a l budge t ing d e c i s i o n p r o c e s s . This p a r t i c u l a r d e c i s i o n p r o c e s s 
a l l o w s one t o e v a l u a t e the e f f e c t s o f a d e c i s i o n maker's r i s k t o l e r a n c e 
on t h a t p r o c e s s . In t h i s s t u d y , r i s k t o l e r a n c e w i l l be d e f i n e d as a 
d e c i s i o n maker's p r o p e n s i t y toward the acceptance o f t a k i n g r i s k s ( r i s k 
s e e k i n g or r i s k t o l e r a n c e ) or h i s a v o i d i n g the t a k i n g of r i s k s ( r i s k 
a v e r s e or r i s k i n t o l e r a n c e ) . 
Due to the nature o f the mathemat ica l model u s e d , a c o n s t r a i n e d 
o p t i m i z a t i o n model which i s s o l v e d by the o u t - o f - k i l t e r a l g o r i t h m of 
network t h e o r y , m u l t i - l e v e l d e c i s i o n p r o c e s s e s can a l s o be s t u d i e d . The 
model and the type of o r g a n i z a t i o n i t r e p r e s e n t s i s f u l l y d e s c r i b e d i n 
Chapter I I I . A m u l t i - l e v e l d e c i s i o n p r o c e s s i s a d e c i s i o n p r o c e s s i n 
which i n d i v i d u a l s from more than one l e v e l o f an h i e r a r c h i c a l o r g a n i z a t i o n 
p a r t i c i p a t e . In such a d e c i s i o n p r o c e s s , no s i n g l e i n d i v i d u a l can be 
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p i n p o i n t e d as the d e c i s i o n maker. This s tudy w i l l be concerned o n l y w i t h 
the t w o - l e v e l d e c i s i o n p r o c e s s . This a l l o w s the study of the i n t e r p l a y 
o f the r i s k t o l e r a n c e s o f a t l e a s t two i n d i v i d u a l s in the p r o c e s s and the 
e f f e c t s o f t h e s e r i s k t o l e r a n c e s on the outcomes of the p r o c e s s . Another 
o b j e c t i v e o f t h i s r e s e a r c h w i l l be to s tudy t h e e f f e c t i v e n e s s of budget ­
ary c o n s t r a i n t s in a c h i e v i n g r e s o l u t i o n o f d i f f e r e n c e s between i n d i v i d u a l s 
o p e r a t i n g w i t h d i f f e r e n t r i s k t o l e r a n c e s w i t h i n a g iven d e c i s i o n p r o c e s s . 
A l l o f t h e s e g o a l s can be accompl i shed by u s i n g e x p e c t e d u t i l i t y 
as the d e c i s i o n c r i t e r i o n in the d e c i s i o n p r o c e s s . The advantage gained 
from t h i s i s t h a t i t a l l o w s d i r e c t manipu la t ion o f a "r i sk f a c t o r " in 
each d e c i s i o n maker's v a l u e f u n c t i o n . Moreover, when making d e c i s i o n s 
under u n c e r t a i n t y , many d e c i s i o n t h e o r i s t s advocate the use o f e x p e c t e d 
u t i l i t y as the d e c i s i o n c r i t e r i o n [ 1 3 , 2 0 , 2 3 , 2 6 , 3 8 ] . These e x p e r t s con­
tend t h a t t h e use o f e x p e c t e d u t i l i t y most f u l l y r e c o g n i z e s the r i s k i n ­
v o l v e d i n t h e d e c i s i o n ( r i s k i n e s s o f the t a s k ) and by the use of a 
p r o b a b i l i s t i c w e i g h t i n g o f the u t i l i t i e s , e x p r e s s e s a range of p o s s i b l e 
outcomes in terms o f a s i n g l e outcome. 
Assumptions 
During the performance o f t h i s r e s e a r c h , i t became n e c e s s a r y to 
make c e r t a i n a s s u m p t i o n s . Sometimes t h e s e assumpt ions were made in order 
to s i m p l i f y numerica l computa t ions . Other t imes they were made in order 
to e x p l a i n c e r t a i n behav ior which cou ld not be m a t h e m a t i c a l l y modeled. 
Below i s a l i s t o f the c r i t i c a l assumpt ions made during t h i s r e s e a r c h . 
1. A l l i n d i v i d u a l s i n v o l v e d i n the d e c i s i o n p r o c e s s use expec ted 
u t i l i t y as t h e i r v a l u e c r i t e r i o n and each d e c i s i o n maker's u t i l i t y func­
t i o n remains c o n s t a n t for a l l d e c i s i o n s . 
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2. The u t i l i t y f u n c t i o n of each d e c i s i o n maker i s quadrat i c i n 
n a t u r e . 
3 . Each d e c i s i o n maker o p e r a t e s w i th some l e v e l of r i s k t o l e r a n c e 
i n h e r e n t to h i s d e c i s i o n p r o c e s s and t h i s l e v e l o f r i s k t o l e r a n c e remains 
c o n s t a n t for a l l d e c i s i o n s . 
4 . Expected u t i l i t i e s are a d d i t i v e . 
5. A l l t a s k s and p r o j e c t s used are independent o f one a n o t h e r . 
6 . At i n c r e a s e d funding l e v e l s , ta sk means w i l l not be decreased 
and t a s k v a r i a n c e s w i l l i n c r e a s e or d e c r e a s e randomly. 
7. The v a r i a n c e s o f t a s k s w i l l be uni formly d i s t r i b u t e d between 
two p o i n t s which w i l l be a r b i t r a r i l y c h o s e n . 
Other assumpt ions a r i s e due to the p a r t i c u l a r model s e l e c t e d and 
are d e t a i l e d in Chapter I I I . In summary, t h e s e assumpt ions a r e : 
8 . B e n e f i t f u n c t i o n s are p i e c e - w i s e l i n e a r . 
9 . The b e n e f i t for an i n t e r m e d i a t e funding p o i n t i s g iven by the 
p i e c e - w i s e l i n e a r curve c o n n e c t i n g the b e n e f i t p o i n t s a s s o c i a t e d w i th the 
a l t e r n a t i v e funding l e v e l s . 
10. A t a s k i s funded w h o l l y w i t h i n o n l y one branch and i s a s s o c i ­
a t e d wi th o n l y one p r o j e c t . 
11. The s o l u t i o n procedure for the model i s n e a r - o p t i m a l , i t does 
not a lways prov ide opt imal s o l u t i o n s . 
12. The c o n s t r a i n e d o p t i m i z a t i o n model i s a r e a s o n a b l e r e p r e s e n ­
t a t i o n of an i n d i v i d u a l d e c i s i o n maker. 
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CHAPTER I I 
LITERATURE SURVEY 
This t h e s i s draws upon t h r e e d i s t i n c t a r e a s o f the l i t e r a t u r e for 
i t s background. As t h e r e have been r e l a t i v e l y few works in the l i t e r a ­
t u r e which d e a l w i t h the problem as approached by t h i s s t u d y , the l i t e r a ­
ture c i t e d w i l l s e r v e to form the background and t h e o r e t i c a l b a s i s for 
the mathemat ica l model used . 
Those works c u r r e n t l y i n the l i t e r a t u r e which do d e a l w i t h m u l t i -
person d e c i s i o n s are on ly p a r t i a l l y a p p l i c a b l e t o t h i s work. The works 
o f R u e f l i [ 3 0 , 3 1 ] take a d e c o m p o s i t i o n . . . goa l programming approach to the 
g e n e r a l i z e d m u l t i - p e r s o n d e c i s i o n problem. M e s a r o v i c , Macko, and Taka-
hara [ 2 7 ] at tempt to d e a l w i t h t h i s problem in i t s most g e n e r a l form by 
the use o f sys tems t h e o r y . None of t h e s e works i s d i r e c t l y a p p l i c a b l e 
to t h i s s tudy because of t h e i r g e n e r a l n a t u r e . The t h r e e works c i t e d , in 
the most g e n e r a l way, e x p l a i n some of the p r o c e s s e s which occur in the 
m u l t i - l e v e l d e c i s i o n problem. However, due to t h e i r g e n e r a l i t y they 
prov ide no d i r e c t l y a p p l i c a b l e r e s u l t s . A l so the approaches o u t l i n e d in 
t h e s e works make no p r o v i s i o n s for a l l o w i n g the p e c u l i a r i t i e s o f the 
R & D d e c i s i o n to be i n c l u d e d t h e r e i n . 
R & D P r o j e c t S e l e c t i o n 
The area o f R & D p r o j e c t s e l e c t i o n has been i n v e s t i g a t e d by a 
number of r e s e a r c h e r s in the r e c e n t p a s t . Baker and Pound [ 3 ] , Baker 
and Free land [ 6 ] , Souder [ 3 7 ] , A l b o o s t a and Holzman [ l ] , Cetron , Mart ino , 
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and Roepcke [ 8 ] p r e s e n t a comprehensive overv iew of t h e l i t e r a t u r e in t h i s 
a r e a . In p a r t i c u l a r , the Baker-Free land paper c o v e r s some 237 a r t i c l e s 
and books . A few of the more r e l e v a n t s o u r c e s found i n t h e s e overv iews 
w i l l be d e a l t w i t h in g r e a t e r d e t a i l . 
Cramer and Smith [lo] prov ide an i n t e r e s t i n g approach to R & D 
p r o j e c t s e l e c t i o n . They beg in by v i e w i n g t h e p r o j e c t s e l e c t i o n p r o c e s s 
as a r i s k y d e c i s i o n . From t h e r e , they advance to a u t i l i t y approach to 
v a l u e measurement and then combine the two to form an e x p e c t e d u t i l i t y 
o b j e c t i v e f u n c t i o n for the d e c i s i o n makers . The model used i n t h i s 
t h e s i s makes d i r e c t use of the d e c i s i o n maker's o b j e c t i v e f u n c t i o n as 
advocated by Cramer and Smith. 
In the area of p r o j e c t s e l e c t i o n i t s e l f , many approaches can be 
found in the l i t e r a t u r e . Freeman [18 ] a d v o c a t e s a s t o c h a s t i c model to 
determine the s i z e of an R & D budget and i t s a l l o c a t i o n among p r o j e c t s . 
He u s e s p r o b a b i l i t y d i s t r i b u t i o n s to d e s c r i b e p r o j e c t s and maximizes e x ­
p e c t e d v a l u e o f the r e s u l t i n g p o r t f o l i o . Hess [21] p r e s e n t s a dynamic 
programming approach to the s e l e c t i o n and budget ing of R & D p r o j e c t s . 
Given e s t i m a t e s of the d i s c o u n t e d v a l u e of f u t u r e p r o j e c t s as of s e v e r a l 
p o i n t s in t ime and e s t i m a t e s of the p r o b a b i l i t i e s o f s u c c e s s , the model 
s e l e c t s t h a t s e t o f p r o j e c t s which maximized the t o t a l e x p e c t e d v a l u e 
o f a l l p r o j e c t s . Rosen and Souder [29 ] extended H e s s ' s model by con­
s i d e r i n g d i f f e r e n t o p t i m i z a t i o n c r i t e r i a for o b t a i n i n g f u t u r e f i n d i n g 
p a t t e r n s . They i n c l u d e d e x p e c t e d p r o f i t , expec ted r e s e a r c h s u c c e s s e s , 
and re turn on e x p e n d i t u r e in the c r i t e r i a u t i l i z e d . Their model d e t e r ­
m i n e s : (a) the maximum e x p e c t e d p r o f i t from a l l p r o j e c t s over a l l t ime 
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p e r i o d s ; (b) the op t ima l budget a l l o c a t e d among the p r o j e c t s for the 
current t ime p e r i o d ; ( c ) the o p t i m a l f u t u r e e x p e n d i t u r e s for each t ime 
p e r i o d ; and, (d) the e x p e c t e d re turn of each p r o j e c t corresponding to 
the opt imal f u t u r e e x p e n d i t u r e s . 
Atkinson and Bobis [2] formulated and s o l v e d a r e s o u r c e a l l o c a t i o n 
model which e x p l i c i t l y account s for the v a r i a t i o n of a l l o c a t e d r e s o u r c e s 
over t i m e . The model i s based upon the s i n g l e c r i t e r i o n of e x p e c t e d 
p r o f i t . However, t h i s model i s ex treme ly complex and would be unwieldy 
to implement as an a i d t o d e c i s i o n makers . A lboos ta and Holzman [1] 
p r e s e n t a model f o r op t ima l funding of an R & D p o r t f o l i o . The c r i t e r i o n 
A l b o o s t a and Holzman choose for o p t i m i z a t i o n i s a s u b j e c t i v e e x p e c t e d 
v a l u e i n a goa l o r i e n t e d model . The most i n t e r e s t i n g i d e a p r e s e n t e d i s 
the format ion of a f u n c t i o n t o d e s c r i b e p r o j e c t r i s k and t h i s i s then 
u t i l i z e d in s o l v i n g for the opt imal funding p a t t e r n . Watters [39] i n 
h i s Ph.D. d i s s e r t a t i o n p r e s e n t s y e t another p r o j e c t s e l e c t i o n model . 
This model u s e s a u t i l i t y theory approach and t r e a t s the d e c i s i o n as one 
made under u n c e r t a i n t y . W a t t e r s ' c r i t e r i a for o p t i m i z a t i o n i n c l u d e max­
i m i z a t i o n o f e x p e c t e d u t i l i t y and m i n i m i z a t i o n of r i s k to the o r g a n i z a ­
t i o n . The model i n c l u d e s the c a p a b i l i t i e s of h a n d l i n g p r o j e c t depend­
e n c e s and p r o b a b i l i s t i c budget c o n s t r a i n t s . 
Baker, Shumway, Souder, and Maher [ 4 ] p r e s e n t a network formula­
t i o n for the s e l e c t i o n of and r e s o u r c e a l l o c a t i o n to R & D p r o j e c t s i n a 
l a r g e m u l t i - l e v e l o r g a n i z a t i o n . This model u s e s s u b j e c t i v e t h r e e p o i n t 
e s t i m a t e s o f v a l u e f o r each p r o j e c t and then s o l v e s a m i n i m i z a t i o n of 
n e g a t i v e v a l u e problems . The model w i l l not handle p r o j e c t dependenc ies 
but i s c o m p u t a t i o n a l l y r e l a t i v e l y s i m p l e . Hence i t can be implemented 
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i n a r e a l time mode and be of use t o the d e c i s i o n maker. This model w i l l 
be d i s c u s s e d i n g r e a t e r d e t a i l in the nex t chapter as i t forms the b a s i s 
for the r e s e a r c h c o n t a i n e d in t h i s t h e s i s . 
D e c i s i o n Theory 
I n d i v i d u a l d e c i s i o n theory i s an area which has been h e a v i l y r e ­
searched by both management s c i e n t i s t s and p s y c h o l o g i s t s . J u s t r e c e n t l y , 
an e x c e l l e n t rev i ew of t h e l i t e r a t u r e in t h i s area was p u b l i s h e d by S l o v i c 
and L i c h t e n s t e i n [ 3 6 ] . In t h i s paper , the authors c o n t r a s t the b a s i c 
approaches t o t h i s area and d e t a i l the models formed by each approach. 
They run the gamut from i n f e r e n c e in u n c e r t a i n environments [ 7 ] , through 
s u b j e c t i v e p r o b a b i l i t i e s [ l l ] , to computer s i m u l a t i o n of thought [ 2 8 ] . 
S ince t h i s r ev i ew of the l i t e r a t u r e i s an e x c e l l e n t o n e , i t w i l l not be 
d e t a i l e d h e r e . The reader i s r e f e r r e d to the o r i g i n a l work for more i n ­
f o r m a t i o n . However, the u t i l i t y theory a s p e c t of d e c i s i o n making w i l l be 
d e a l t w i t h i n more d e t a i l h e r e . 
The r e a s o n s f o r t u r n i n g to u t i l i t y theory i n the R & D d e c i s i o n 
have been s u c c i n c t l y s t a t e d by W a t t e r s : 
When outcomes are r e l a t i v e l y l a r g e and r i s k y , a p r e f e r e n c e 
s t r u c t u r e i s d e s i r e d which r e f l e c t s more than j u s t p r e d i l i c -
t i o n f o r maximum monetary r e t u r n . The c o n s t r u c t i o n of such 
p r e f e r e n c e s t r u c t u r e s for use in d e c i s i o n - m a k i n g s i t u a t i o n s 
f a l l s q u i t e n a t u r a l l y i n t o the realm of u t i l i t y theory [ 3 9 ] . 
A method for q u a n t i f y i n g p r e f e r e n c e s t r u c t u r e s such that d e c i s i o n s 
o f the above type can be made on a r a t i o n a l and i n t e r n a l l y c o n s i s t e n t 
b a s i s has been deve loped by von-Neumann and Morgenstern [ 3 8 ] . They have 
shown t h a t , once a p e r s o n ' s u t i l i t y f u n c t i o n i s e s t a b l i s h e d f o r a d e c i ­
s i o n s i t u a t i o n in conformity w i t h c e r t a i n c o n s i s t e n c y ax ioms , the proper 
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c r i t e r i o n to be used as the b a s i s for making the d e c i s i o n i s maximizat ion 
of e x p e c t e d u t i l i t y . D e t a i l e d d i s c u s s i o n s o f the von-Neumann-Morgenstern 
u t i l i t y theory are g i v e n by Savage [32] and i m p l i c a t i o n s and i n t e r p r e t a ­
t i o n s o f the axioms appear in many s o u r c e s , two of which are Luce and 
R a i f f a [ 2 3 ] and Fishburn [ l 4 ] . 
In order to make use of t h i s theory of u t i l i t y in the p r o j e c t s e ­
l e c t i o n p r o c e s s , some f u n c t i o n a l r e l a t i o n s h i p s o t h e r than d i s c r e t e p o i n t s 
read from a u t i l i t y curve must be e s t a b l i s h e d . Markowitz [26 ] e s t a b l i s h e s 
an e x p e c t a t i o n - v a r i a n c e c r i t e r i o n f u n c t i o n , for use in s e l e c t i n g e f f i c i e n t 
inves tment p o r t f o l i o s . Watters [39 ] on pp. 30-32 o f h i s d i s s e r t a t i o n 
shows t h a t t h i s e x p e c t a t i o n - v a r i a n c e c r i t e r i o n f u n c t i o n i s a very c l o s e 
approximat ion t o a bonaf ide u t i l i t y f u n c t i o n . He a l s o shows t h a t the 
q u a d r a t i c u t i l i t y f u n c t i o n can a l s o be approximated u s i n g the e x p e c t a t i o n -
v a r i a n c e c r i t e r i o n and t h a t t h e s e approx imat ions do o f f e r improvements over 
the e x p e c t e d re turn c r i t e r i o n in making h i g h r i s k outcome d e c i s i o n s . 
Moreover, when no r i s k a v e r s i o n i s found in the d e c i s i o n maker, the 
e x p e c t a t i o n - v a r i a n c e c r i t e r i o n f u n c t i o n d e g e n e r a t e s to the exp ec t ed re turn 
c r i t e r i o n . 
O r g a n i z a t i o n Theory 
The l i t e r a t u r e o f the f i e l d o f o r g a n i z a t i o n theory i s q u i t e l a r g e 
and d i v e r s e . Works by authors such as Simon [ 3 5 ] , March and Simon [ 2 5 ] , 
Edwards [ l l ] , and o t h e r s tend to g i v e an e x c e l l e n t overv iew o f the f i e l d . 
Other a u t h o r s , such as S c h u l l , De lbecq , and Cummings [33] have looked 
i n t o the area they c a l l " o r g a n i z a t i o n a l d e c i s i o n making ." In t h i s work 
the authors s tudy d e c i s i o n making and d e c i s i o n p r o c e s s e s in the c o n t e x t 
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of the type of o r g a n i z a t i o n in which they o c c u r . However, no o r g a n i z a ­
t i o n a l l i t e r a t u r e was found which d i r e c t l y supported t h i s p a r t i c u l a r 
r e s e a r c h . 
Summary 
In t h i s c h a p t e r , a b r i e f rev iew of the l i t e r a t u r e s r e l a t i n g to 
t h i s r e s e a r c h was p r e s e n t e d . This survey touched upon t h r e e s e p a r a t e 
l i t e r a t u r e a r e a s : d e c i s i o n t h e o r y , R & D p r o j e c t s e l e c t i o n methodology , 
and o r g a n i z a t i o n t h e o r y . E x c e l l e n t survey papers were found and p r e s e n t e d 
i n the a r e a s o f p r o j e c t s e l e c t i o n methodology and d e c i s i o n t h e o r y . The 
area of o r g a n i z a t i o n theory was found to be somewhat empty, so f a r as 
d i r e c t a p p l i c a t i o n t o t h i s r e s e a r c h i s concerned . 
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CHAPTER I I I 
DEVELOPMENT OF THE MODEL 
D e s c r i p t i o n of the Organ iza t ion Modeled 
The f o l l o w i n g i s a d e s c r i p t i o n of the o r g a n i z a t i o n taken from the 
o r i g i n a l paper by Baker, Shumway, Souder, Maher, and Rubenste in [5 ] i n 
which the model was o r i g i n a l l y p r e s e n t e d . This d i s c u s s i o n i s i n c l u d e d so 
t h a t the reader can ge t a f e e l for the type of o r g a n i z a t i o n for which 
t h i s r e s e a r c h may be r e l e v a n t . 
The o r g a n i z a t i o n w i t h i n which t h i s s tudy was conducted i s 
t y p i c a l o f many l a r g e f e d e r a l R & D o r g a n i z a t i o n s . I t i s char ­
a c t e r i z e d by s e v e r a l a d m i n i s t r a t i v e l e v e l s , each of which h a s , 
w i t h i n imposed l i m i t a t i o n s , c o n s i d e r a b l e autonomy over i t s own 
o p e r a t i o n . The budget p r o c e s s i s s e q u e n t i a l i n n a t u r e ; t h a t i s , 
budget guidance in the form of recommended funding i s i s s u e d from 
each s u p e r o r d i n a t e l e v e l t o i t s immediate subord inate l e v e l s , 
b a s e d , in t u r n , on the guidance i t has r e c e i v e d and on i t s d e ­
c i s i o n as t o how the budget should be f u r t h e r a p p o r t i o n e d . Thus, 
guidance in format ion f lows from the h i g h e s t a d m i n i s t r a t i v e l e v e l , 
through a l l i n t e r m e d i a t e l e v e l s , and on to the l o w e s t o r g a n i z a ­
t i o n a l u n i t . In a d d i t i o n to budget guidance accord ing to o r g a n i ­
z a t i o n a l e n t i t y , guidance i s a l s o i s s u e d a c c o r d i n g to t e c h n i c a l 
a r e a s . For example , a l a b o r a t o r y w i l l r e c e i v e guidance regard ing 
i t s t o t a l budget and guidance i n d i c a t i n g a c c e p t a b l e budgets for 
s e l e c t e d p r o j e c t s and groups of p r o j e c t s . The l a b o r a t o r y , in 
t u r n , w i l l i s s u e guidance for i t s subord ina te o r g a n i z a t i o n s and 
f o r i t s p r o j e c t s u b - e n t i t i e s . 
A f t e r guidance r e a c h e s the lowes t o r g a n i z a t i o n a l l e v e l , the 
i n f o r m a t i o n f low i s r e v e r s e d . Each subord inate l e v e l t r a n s m i t s a 
proposed budget a l l o c a t i o n to i t s immediate s u p e r o r d i n a t e l e v e l 
i n which the subord ina te l e v e l d e t a i l s how i t would a l l o c a t e the 
guidance budgets i f they were in f a c t to be a u t h o r i z e d . These 
proposed a l l o c a t i o n s are i n t e g r a t e d a t each l e v e l and are then 
communicated to the nex t h i g h e r l e v e l . This downward-upward f low 
c y c l e may recur many t imes for more than one s e t o f f i g u r e s . 
U l t i m a t e l y the h i g h e s t o r g a n i z a t i o n a l l e v e l r e c e i v e s a proposed 
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budget a l l o c a t i o n e i t h e r c o n s i s t e n t w i t h the f i g u r e s i t o r i g i n a l l y 
i s s u e d as guidance or o t h e r w i s e a c c e p t a b l e to i t . 
E v e n t u a l l y , the h i g h e s t a d m i n i s t r a t i v e l e v e l de termines the 
t o t a l amount o f funding which w i l l be a p p r o p r i a t e d for the e n t i r e 
r e s e a r c h o r g a n i z a t i o n . The a p p r o p r i a t e d a l l o c a t i o n s then f low 
through the o r g a n i z a t i o n a l h i e r a r c h y in a manner analogous to the 
f low of the guidance i n f o r m a t i o n . At t h i s p o i n t , each o r g a n i z a ­
t i o n a l l e v e l knows, w i t h i n l i m i t s , the l e v e l o f funding i t can 
a n t i c i p a t e dur ing the f i s c a l year and the budgetary c o n s t r a i n t s 
which have been imposed on i t s o p e r a t i o n . S p e c i f i c f i s c a l year 
budget p l a n s are then made. F r e q u e n t l y , t h e s e p lans must be r e ­
v i s e d during the y e a r , s i n c e the e v e n t u a l a u t h o r i z a t i o n s may d e ­
v i a t e from the a p p r o p r i a t i o n s . A c c o r d i n g l y , s e v e r a l t imes during 
the year each o r g a n i z a t i o n a l l e v e l i s faced w i th a r e s o u r c e a l l o ­
c a t i o n d e c i s i o n which i s c h a r a c t e r i z e d by a l a r g e number of budget ­
ary c o n s t r a i n t s , d e f i n e d both by o r g a n i z a t i o n a l e n t i t y and by r e ­
search a r e a . 
The p r e c e d i n g d i s c u s s i o n i s taken d i r e c t l y from "A Budget A l l o c a ­
t i o n Model for Large H i e r a r c h i c a l R & D O r g a n i z a t i o n s " by N. R. Baker, 
W. E. Souder, C. R. Shumway, P. N. Maher, and A. H. Rubanstein [ 5 ] . 
The Model 
The model to be used in t h i s s tudy must p o s s e s s c e r t a i n c h a r a c t e r ­
i s t i c s . I t must a l s o a l l o w the s tudy of two or more i n d i v i d u a l s from 
d i f f e r e n t l e v e l s of the o r g a n i z a t i o n a c t i n g w i t h i n a g iven d e c i s i o n p r o ­
c e s s . This w i l l a l l o w the m u l t i - l e v e l a s p e c t o f the d e c i s i o n p r o c e s s to 
be s t u d i e d . F o r t u n a t e l y , among the l a r g e number of R & D models d e v e l ­
oped, t h e r e does e x i s t one which f i t s the requirements of t h i s s tudy w i t h 
v e r y few m o d i f i c a t i o n s . This i s the model deve loped and used by Baker, 
Maher, Shumway, Souder, and Rubenste in ['5]. This model w i l l be b r i e f l y 
d i s c u s s e d in t h i s chapter and the n e c e s s a r y m o d i f i c a t i o n s w i l l a l s o be 
n o t e d . 
This model i s d e s i g n e d to r e p r e s e n t a l a r g e d e c e n t r a l i z e d r e s e a r c h 
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o r g a n i z a t i o n . This o r g a n i z a t i o n has two d i s t i n c t h i e r a r c h i e s which can 
be i d e n t i f i e d ; an o r g a n i z a t i o n a l or a d m i n i s t r a t i v e h i e r a r c h y , and an 
a c t i v i t y h i e r a r c h y . The a d m i n i s t r a t i v e h i e r a r c h y can be c o n s i d e r e d as 
c o n s i s t i n g o f a headquar ter s c o n t a i n i n g d i v i s i o n s and b r a n c h e s , and a 
s u b o r d i n a t e l e v e l , c o n s i s t i n g of l a b o r a t o r i e s and d i r e c t o r i e s . This 
h i e r a r c h y i s r e p r e s e n t e d in F igure 1. 
In the a d m i n i s t r a t i v e h i e r a r c h y , the d i v i s i o n s and branches are 
p r i m a r i l y i n v o l v e d in p lann ing and budget s p e c i f i c a t i o n s . The l a b o r a ­
t o r i e s and d i r e c t o r i e s are concerned wi th the e x p e n d i t u r e o f budgets on 
s p e c i f i c a c t i v i t i e s . These two f a c e t s of the a d m i n i s t r a t i v e h i e r a r c h y 
are l i n k e d by t h e t a s k s . 
The a c t i v i t y h i e r a r c h y c o n s i s t s of the s p e c i f i c r e s e a r c h a c t i v i ­
t i e s , of which t h e r e are t h r e e . These are r e s e a r c h programs which con­
t a i n r e s e a r c h p r o j e c t s or a r e a s . The p r o j e c t s are composed of r e s e a r c h 
t a s k s which are the a c t u a l e n t i t i e s which are performed. This a c t i v i t y 
h i e r a r c h y i s r e p r e s e n t e d i n Figure 2 . 
With one a s sumpt ion , a key r e l a t i o n s h i p can be c o n s t r u c t e d between 
t h e s e two h i e r a r c h i e s . This r e l a t i o n s h i p then a l l o w s a network r e p r e s e n ­
t a t i o n of the r e s e a r c h o r g a n i z a t i o n under c o n s i d e r a t i o n to be c o n s t r u c t e d . 
This r e l a t i o n s h i p i s t h a t any ta sk i s funded w h o l l y w i t h i n a g iven branch 
and i s u n i q u e l y a s s o c i a t e d w i t h one and on ly one p r o j e c t . This t i e s the 
two h i e r a r c h i e s t o g e t h e r in such a manner as to a l l o w c o n s t r u c t i o n of 
the network shown in F igure 3 . 
Because o f the nature of both the a d m i n i s t r a t i v e and r e s e a r c h 
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17 
problem w i t h a s i n g l e commodity (budget d o l l a r s ) f l o w i n g through t h e n e t ­
work. The n e c e s s a r y c h a r a c t e r i s t i c i s t h a t s u b o r d i n a t e e n t i t i e s can be 
r e p r e s e n t e d as a s s o c i a t e d w i t h one and o n l y one s u p e r o r d i n a t e e n t i t y . 
At h e a d q u a r t e r s , each branch i s a s s o c i a t e d w i t h one and on ly one d i v i s i o n 
and, a t the l a b o r a t o r i e s , each d i r e c t o r a t e i s a s s o c i a t e d w i th one and 
o n l y one l a b o r a t o r y . The a g e n c y ' s t a s k s are a s s o c i a t e d w i t h one and 
o n l y one p r o j e c t , and p r o j e c t s w i t h one and on ly one program e l e m e n t . 
Thus the r e q u i r e d c h a r a c t e r i s t i c i s ma in ta ined throughout both h i e r a r ­
c h i e s . The o u t - o f - k i l t e r a l g o r i t h m i s used to s o l v e the r e w r i t t e n 
problem [ 1 7 ] . 
where v . ( x . ) i s the b e n e f i t o f t a s k i a t funding l e v e l x . . The f u l l 
J J J 
mathemat ica l f ormula t ion o f the problem i s as f o l l o w s : 
The mathemat ica l formula t ion o f the model to be used i s : 
Min - v . ( x . ) (1) 
Max £ v . ( x . ) or Min 
j J J 
( 2 . 1 ) 
s u b j e c t to 
B ^ S x . ^ B + ( 2 . 2 ) 
+ 
V i 
( 2 . 3 ) 
'I 
( 2 . 4 ) 
( 2 . 5 ) 
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J J J 
V j ( 2 . 6 ) 
B £ s x . <; B + V P ( 2 . 7 ) 
p HP J 
P 
V e ( 2 . 8 ) 
where x . i s the l e v e l a t which t a s k i i s funded 
J J 
jeX; J £ - 1 , 2 , . . . 0 i d e n t i f i e s the t a s k s b e l o n g i n g i n l a b o r a t o r y i 
j e d ; d = l , 2 , . . . N i d e n t i f i e s the t a s k s b e l o n g i n g in d i v i s i o n d 
j e b ; b = l , 2 , . . . M i d e n t i f i e s the t a s k s b e l o n g i n g in branch b 
j e p ; p = l , 2 , . . . P i d e n t i f i e s the t a s k s b e l o n g i n g in p r o j e c t p 
j e e ; e = l , 2 , . . . E i d e n t i f i e s the t a s k s b e l o n g i n g in program e 
B and B + are the lower and upper b u d g e t s , r e s p e c t i v e l y 
v . ( x . ) i s the v a l u e o f p r o j e c t j funded a t l e v e l x . 
the b e n e f i t of each t a s k i s determined a t t h r e e funding l e v e l s , a minimum 
funding l e v e l , a recommended l e v e l , and a maximum l e v e l . These are d e ­
f i n e d as f o l l o w s : (1) minimum l e v e l a s t h a t l e v e l o f funding below which 
a t a s k cannot be funded w i t h o u t e n c o u n t e r i n g u n a c c e p t a b l e c o n s e q u e n c e s ; 
(2) recommended l e v e l i s t h a t l e v e l p r e f e r r e d by the o r g a n i z a t i o n a l u n i t 
c o n s i s t e n t w i t h o v e r a l l gu idance ; and (3) maximum l e v e l i s t h a t l e v e l 
above which a t a s k cannot be funded w i t h o u t e n c o u n t e r i n g s i g n i f i c a n t l y 
d i m i n i s h i n g r e t u r n s . For each funding l e v e l e s t i m a t e , a corresponding 
b e n e f i t measurement i s s u p p l i e d . 
J 
B e n e f i t Determinat ion 
In the model as o r i g i n a l l y d e s i g n e d and used by Baker e_t a l . [ 4 ] , 
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The f o l l o w i n g d i s c u s s i o n , taken from Baker, e_t a l . [5 ] i s i n c l u d e d 
so t h a t the reader w i l l have a b e t t e r unders tanding of the model . 
For each j , funding l e v e l s x . are s p e c i f i e d . There l e v e l s o f 
funding (k) have been employed;^k=l i s the minimum l e v e l (a l e v e l 
below which a u n i t cannot be funded w i t h o u t e n c o u n t e r i n g u n a c c e p t ­
a b l e c o n s e q u e n c e s ) , k=2 i s the recommended l e v e l (a l e v e l p r e f e r r e d 
by the o r g a n i z a t i o n a l u n i t c o n s i s t e n t w i t h o v e r a l l s u p e r o r d i n a t e 
g u i d a n c e ) , k=3 i s the maximum l e v e l (a l e v e l beyond which a u n i t 
cannot be funded w i t h o u t e n c o u n t e r i n g significantly d i m i n i s h i n g 
r e t u r n s ) . For each x^, a b e n e f i t e s t i m a t e , v . i s s p e c i f i e d . 
J J 
^ A o i e c e w i s e l i n e a r b e n e f i t f u n c t i o n , v . ( x . ) , i s d e f i n e d through 
v . , v . , v . , f o r each j as f o l l o w s . The a n a l y s t s p e c i f i e s an a c -
c ^ p t a o l e p e r c e n t o f e r r o r " which i s used to t e s t for the l i n e a r i t y 
o f each v . ( x . ) . The b e s t l e a s t squares r e g r e s s i o n approximat ion of 
v . ( x . ) , v"!(x^) . i s c a l c u l a t e d . I f the a s s o c i a t e d l e a s t squares 
estimates o f V T , v ? , and v ? , t h a t i s , v\, v ? , and v^ , are a l l w i t h i n 
the "acceptable 1 p e r c e n t o f - ' error" then v.(x~!) i s assumed t o be 
l i n e a r . I f any one o f the v^ are not wi £hin the a c c e p t a b l e percent 
o f e r r o r " , then v . ( x . ) i s tested t o determine i f i t i s concave or 
convex . S ince the're-'are on ly two l i n e a r segments and s i n c e a l l the 
v . ( x . ) are n o n d e c r e a s i n g i n x . , the t e s t c o n s i s t s on ly of a compari-
sin if the two { j lopes . S p e c i f i c a l l y , ^ ^ 
v . - v . v . - v . 
s.-, = -̂ i s compared to s . _ = —̂  ^ . 
i l 2 1 r i2 3 2 
x . - x . J x . - x . 
J J J J 
I f s . ^ > s « 2 , then v . ( x . ) i s c o n c a v e . I f s . ^ < s ^ , then v . ( x . ) i s 
convex . Trie a l g o r i t h m works d i r e c t l y w i t h v . ( x . ) ^ s which are l i n e a r 
J J 
or c o n c a v e . 
I f v . ( x . ) i s convex , then the a l g o r i t h m works w i t h one of four 
l i n e a r a p p r o x i m a t i o n s . The four l i n e a r approx imat ions a v a i l a b l e 
are the l i n e a r r e g r e s s i o n approximat ion and the l i n e s d e f i n e d by 
( V j , v ? ) , by ( V J , v ? ) , and by ( v ? , v j ) . The opt imal funding p a t t e r n 
where a l l convex v . \ X j ) ' s are e s t i m a t e d by the l i n e a r r e g r e s s i o n a p ­
prox imat ion i s a lways computed. I f so s p e c i f i e d i n the input d a t a , 
the computer program w i l l a l s o determine the opt imal funding p a t t e r n 
w i t h a l l convex V j ( x ^ ) e s t i m a t e d by the ( v l , v ? ) approx imat ion , by 
the ( v l , v ^ ) approx imat ion , and/or by the V V j , v p approx imat ion . 
The o r i g i n a l f u n c t i o n s , the V J ( X J ) , are a lways used i n t h e c a l c u ­
l a t i o n of t o t a l b e n e f i t . The program w i l l not use one of the l i n e a r 
approx imat ions to c a l c u l a t e t o t a l b e n e f i t or to i n d i c a t e the b e n e f i t 
o f any s p e c i f i c a l l o c a t i o n . I f more than one l i n e a r approximation 
i s u s e d , o n l y the one which y i e l d s the l a r g e s t t o t a l b e n e f i t i s 
m a i n t a i n e d and r e p o r t e d . Furthermore, i f a l t e r n a t i v e opt imal s o l u -
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t i o n s e x i s t , the a l g o r i t h m w i l l s e l e c t t h a t a l t e r n a t i v e w i t h the 
minimum t o t a l e x p e n d i t u r e . 
There i s one assumption i n h e r e n t i n t h i s development o f p i e c e w i s e -
l i n e a r b e n e f i t f u n c t i o n s . I t i s t h a t the b e n e f i t for an i n t e r m e d i a t e 
funding p o i n t i s g iven by the p i e c e w i s e - l i n e a r curve a t t h a t p o i n t . 
In the o r i g i n a l f o r m u l a t i o n , t h i s b e n e f i t measurement was s p e c i ­
f i e d by the u s e o f s c o r i n g or comparat ive methods . However, t h i s method 
o f a s s i g n i n g v a l u e to the t a s k s i s not a c c e p t a b l e f o r t h i s s t u d y . For 
one t h i n g , t h e r e would be no e x p l i c i t way to manipula te the i n d i v i d u a l ' s 
r i s k t o l e r a n c e . For another t h i n g , a s d e s i g n e d , the model i s not a 
s e l e c t i o n mode l , a c a p a b i l i t y which i s d e s i r e d for t h i s s t u d y , and most 
i m p o r t a n t l y , t h i s s tudy i s not be ing conducted w i t h i n an o r g a n i z a t i o n . 
As a r e s u l t o f the d e s i r e to add a s e l e c t i o n c a p a b i l i t y to the 
mode l , i t was d e c i d e d to change the t h r e e funding l e v e l s used as input 
d a t a . I n s t e a d of u s i n g a minimum, recommended, and maximum l e v e l a s i n ­
p u t , the model w i l l now use a zero (not s e l e c t e d ) , minimum, and maximum 
funding l e v e l . The minimum and maximum funding l e v e l s are d e f i n e d in the 
same manner as above . The zero funding l e v e l w i l l a lways have an a s s o c i ­
a ted b e n e f i t o f 0 . This l e v e l i n d i c a t e s no funding or t h a t the t a s k has 
not been s e l e c t e d . In t h i s manner, the model can be m o d i f i e d to be a 
t a s k s e l e c t i o n as w e l l as r e s o u r c e a l l o c a t i o n model . 
As s t a t e d , the model a s o r i g i n a l l y proposed and used u t i l i z e d 
comparat ive and s c o r i n g methods f o r c a l c u l a t i n g b e n e f i t . This w i l l be 
changed during t h i s s t u d y . I n s t e a d , an e x p e c t e d u t i l i t y or e x p e c t a t i o n -
v a r i a n c e u t i l i t y measure of b e n e f i t w i l l be u s e d . The l i t e r a t u r e i n d i ­
c a t e s t h a t a q u a d r a t i c i s a r e a s o n a b l y d e s c r i p t i v e form for a u t i l i t y 
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f u n c t i o n . The e x p e c t e d u t i l i t y f o r m u l a t i o n , [i - kr , r e s u l t s in a qua­
d r a t i c form o f the u t i l i t y f u n c t i o n . a=2 has been s u g g e s t e d and used by 
many a u t h o r s such as Cramer and Smith [ l O ] , Farrar [ 1 3 ] , Markowitz [ 2 6 ] , 
and Watters [ 3 9 ] . This formula t ion a l s o appears r e a s o n a b l e from an em­
p i r i c a l b a s i s [ l O ] . Furthermore, k i s a c o n v e n i e n t measure for e x p e r i ­
menta l r i s k t o l e r a n c e . Hence, t h i s formulat ion was chosen for use i n 
t h i s s t u d y . 
The p a r t i c u l a r e x p e c t a t i o n - v a r i a n c e u t i l i t y f u n c t i o n to be used in 
t h i s s tudy i s 
E(U.) = i i . - k a 2 (3) 
J J J 
where i s the e x p e c t e d v a l u e (mean) o f the e s t i m a t e d d i s t r i b u t i o n of 
r e t u r n s o f t a s k j 
2 
a . i s the v a r i a n c e o f the d i s t r i b u t i o n of r e t u r n s of t a s k i 
] 
and k i s the r i s k t o l e r a n c e f a c t o r o f the d e c i s i o n maker. 
The r i s k t o l e r a n c e f a c t o r , k, i n d i c a t e s whether the d e c i s i o n maker 
i s r i s k a v e r s e or r i s k s e e k i n g . I t f u r t h e r s p e c i f i e s to what degree the 
d e c i s i o n maker i s r i s k a v e r s e or r i s k s e e k i n g . I t does t h i s by combining 
t h e e x p e c t a t i o n of the return of a ta sk w i t h some w e i g h t i n g of the v a r i ­
ance of t h i s r e t u r n . A r i s k i n t o l e r a n t d e c i s i o n maker would have a p o s i ­
t i v e (k > 0) r i s k t o l e r a n c e f a c t o r . He would shade h i s b e n e f i t o f a 
p r o j e c t on the low s i d e o f i t s e x p e c t e d b e n e f i t . The more p o s i t i v e k, 
the more the d e c i s i o n maker w i l l shade h i s b e n e f i t judgment, and h e n c e , 
the more r i s k i n t o l e r a n t ( c o n s e r v a t i v e ) the d e c i s i o n maker i s . For the 
r i s k t o l e r a n t d e c i s i o n maker, the r i s k t o l e r a n c e f a c t o r , k, w i l l be 
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n e g a t i v e (k < 0 ) . This w i l l cause him t o shade h i s b e n e f i t so t h a t i t 
w i l l be g r e a t e r than the e x p e c t e d b e n e f i t measurement. The more n e g a t i v e 
the r i s k t o l e r a n c e f a c t o r , the h i g h e r w i l l be h i s e s t i m a t e of the b e n e f i t 
o f a g i v e n t a s k , hence the more r i s k t o l e r a n t the d e c i s i o n maker i s . 
Once the model i s prov ided w i t h the e x p e c t a t i o n - v a r i a n c e u t i l i t y 
f u n c t i o n and the t h r e e funding l e v e l s , i t then c o n s t r u c t s a p i e c e w i s e -
l i n e a r b e n e f i t f u n c t i o n f o r each t a s k u s i n g the t h r e e s p e c i f i e d funding 
l e v e l s and a s s o c i a t e d b e n e f i t e s t i m a t e s . These p i e c e w i s e - l i n e a r b e n e f i t 
f u n c t i o n s are used in de termin ing the opt imal funding p a t t e r n based upon 
the s l o p e s of the l i n e a r p i e c e s of t h i s b e n e f i t f u n c t i o n . Due to the 
f a c t t h a t the model l ooks at the s l o p e s o f the l i n e a r p i e c e s of the bene­
f i t f u n c t i o n , t h e r e i s a tendency for the model to f u n c t i o n a t one of the 
t h r e e s p e c i f i e d p o i n t s ; z e r o , minimum, or maximum funding l e v e l . This i s 
due to the change i n s l o p e of the v a l u e f u n c t i o n which i s l i k e l y to occur 
a t t h e s e p o i n t s . 
The model w i l l d i r e c t l y handle any b e n e f i t f u n c t i o n s which are 
l i n e a r or concave . However, i f the b e n e f i t f u n c t i o n i s convex , then one 
or more l i n e a r approx imat ions of t h i s f u n c t i o n are used in the a l g o r i t h m . 
As a r e s u l t , the a l g o r i t h m does not n e c e s s a r i l y prov ide opt imal s o l u t i o n s . 
That i s , the r e s u l t s o b t a i n e d by the u s e of t h i s a l g o r i t h m need not be 
o p t i m a l ; however , they may b e . Because of t h i s s u b - o p t i m a l i t y , i t i s not 
p o s s i b l e to say t h a t the output of the a l g o r i t h m r e p r e s e n t s the b e s t p o s ­
s i b l e s e l e c t i o n of t a s k s and a l l o c a t i o n of money t h e r e t o . Rather , the 
output should be used as guidance by the d e c i s i o n maker(s ) i n the d e ­
c i s i o n p r o c e s s e s . 
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F i g u r e s 4 and 5 i l l u s t r a t e the r e s u l t i n g network for both m o d e l s . 
The c o s t s , c . , a s s o c i a t e d w i t h the network formula t ion are the 
n e g a t i v e of the marginal b e n e f i t per d o l l a r e x p e n d i t u r e . There­
f o r e , the c . depend upon the form of the a s s o c i a t e d v . ( x . ) . I f 
V j ( X j ) i s l i n e a r , c^ i s the s l o p e of v . ( x . ) m u l t i p l i e d by minus 
o n e . I f v - ( x . ) i s c o n v e x , C j i s the slope 1 of the l i n e a r a p p r o x i ­
mation m u l t i p l i e d by minus o n e . I f V J ( X J ) i s c o n c a v e , two a r c s 
are n e c e s s a r y . One arc has c o n s t r a i n t s o f (BT, X ? ) and a c o s t , 
c l , equal to the s l o p e of the l i n e c o n n e c t i n g ( x . , x?) m u l t i p l i e d 
by a minus o n e . The o t h e r arc has c o n s t r a i n t s o f ( x ^ B"t) and a 
c o s t , C j , equa l t o the s l o p e of the l i n e c o n n e c t i n g v x f> x - ) m u l t i ­
p l i e d by a minus o n e . The c j ' s are a t t a c h e d on ly to the f l o w of 
d o l l a r s between nodes n and u. An e c o s t i s a s s i g n e d t o the o v e r ­
a l l budget arc to a s s u r e t h a t , i f a l t e r n a t i v e opt imal s o l u t i o n s 
e x i s t which y i e l d the same maximal v a l u e , the l e a s t c o s t a l t e r n a ­
t i v e i s s e l e c t e d . That i s , i t w i l l prevent the f low of a d d i t i o n a l 
d o l l a r s through the budget arc i f t h a t f low does not i n c r e a s e the 
t o t a l v a l u e of the r e s e a r c h program. A l l o t h e r f lows have zero 
c o s t (or b e n e f i t ) . 
The above d i s c u s s i o n i s taken d i r e c t l y from "A Budget A l l o c a t i o n 
Model f o r Large H i e r a r c h i c a l R & D O r g a n i z a t i o n s , " by Baker, Souder, 
Shumway, Maher, and Rubenste in [ 5 ] . 
I m p l i c i t w i t h i n the development of the model are s e v e r a l assump­
t i o n s which should be made e x p l i c i t . This i s done i n order to make the 
model more u n d e r s t a n d a b l e . These i m p l i c i t assumpt ions a r e : 
1 . A t a s k i s funded w h o l l y w i t h i n a g iven branch and i s a s s o ­
c i a t e d w i t h o n l y one p r o j e c t . 
2 . B e n e f i t f u n c t i o n s are p i e c e w i s e l i n e a r . 
3 . The s o l u t i o n of t h i s model does not n e c e s s a r i l y prov ide 
opt imal s o l u t i o n s . 
4 . Th i s c o n s t r a i n e d o p t i m i z a t i o n model i s a r e a s o n a b l e r e p r e s e n t a ­
t i o n of an i n d i v i d u a l d e c i s i o n maker. 
D i v i s i o n Branch P r o j e c t Program 
Figure 4 . I l l u s t r a t i v e Network of Superordinate Level Model 
D i v i s i o n Branch P r o j e c t Program 
Figure 5. I l l u s t r a t i v e Network of Subordinate Leve l Model 
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Model V a l i d a t i o n 
This model , in i t s o r i g i n a l form, was d e s i g n e d t o be a p r e d i c t i v e 
and d e s c r i p t i v e model of budget a l l o c a t i o n s in a l a r g e r d e c e n t r a l i z e d r e ­
search o r g a n i z a t i o n . I t i s w r i t t e n as an i n t e r a c t i v e computer code to be 
used as an a i d by the d e c i s i o n makers i n the o r g a n i z a t i o n under s tudy by 
the o r i g i n a l r e s e a r c h e r s . In t h i s o r i g i n a l r e s e a r c h by Baker, Shumway, 
Souder, and Maher [ 4 ] , t h i s model was run i n p a r a l l e l w i t h the budget a l l o ­
c a t i o n p r o c e s s a s i t c u r r e n t l y i s done. The d e c i s i o n makers did not know 
of the r e s u l t s g i v e n by the mode l . The r e s u l t s of the model were then 
compared t o t h e a c t u a l budget a l l o c a t i o n s as made by the d e c i s i o n makers 
i n the o r g a n i z a t i o n . Pearson product moment and Spearman rank c o r r e l a ­
t i o n s were u s e d . The product moment c o r r e l a t i o n measures the r e l a t i o n ­
s h i p between the l e v e l s o f funding , t h a t i s , i t c o n s i d e r s the d i f f e r e n c e 
in l e v e l s of f u n d i n g , a l t e r n a t i v e by a l t e r n a t i v e , in the r e s p e c t i v e budget 
a l l o c a t i o n s . In the Spearman rank c o r r e l a t i o n , the a l t e r n a t i v e s were rank 
ordered a c c o r d i n g to l e v e l of funding and t h e s e ranks were then c o r r e ­
l a t e d . Table 1, p r e s e n t e d here by permis s ion of the a u t h o r s , shows the 
r e s u l t s of t h e s e s t a t i s t i c a l compar i sons . These c o r r e l a t i o n s are d e t e r ­
mined for two d i s t i n c t s i t u a t i o n s . The f i r s t s e t o f c o r r e l a t i o n s c o r r e s ­
ponds to the use of recommended budgets by the b r a n c h e s . The second s e t 
of c o r r e l a t i o n s corresponds to a decremented budget . 
As can be seen in Table 1, the model as d e s i g n e d i s a good p r e ­
d i c t o r o f t h e a c t u a l budget a l l o c a t i o n s . Because of t h i s h igh c o r r e l a ­
t i o n of the r e s u l t s of the model t o t h e r e s u l t s of the p r o c e s s be ing 
modeled , i t seems r e a s o n a b l e to assume t h a t t h i s model i s a r e p r e s e n t a t i v e 
of the p r o c e s s under c o n s i d e r a t i o n . The use of such a model in t h i s 
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Table 1 . C o r r e l a t i o n s o f Model Output w i t h Actual Budget Recommendations 
Form o f Branch: C o r r e l a t i o n s a t Base Funding C o r r e l a t i o n s at Decrement 
B e n e f i t No. o f Pearson Spearman Pearson Spearman 
Funct ion A l t e r n a t i v e s Product Moment Rank Product Moment Rank 
Simple 
Compara­
t i v e 
A:12 
p r o j e c t s 
A2:12 
p r o j e c t s 
B:5 
p r o j e c t s 
B:27 
t a s k s 
C:7 
proj e c t s 
C:25 
t a s k s 
D : l l 
p r o j e c t s 
D:27 











































i t i t 
S c o r i n g 
Model 
A:12 
p r o j e c t s 
A2:9 
p r o j e c t s 
B:5 

















1. Branch Chief A r e q u e s t e d that h i s b e n e f i t s c o r e s be d i v i d e d by c o s t 
thus y i e l d i n g a b e n e f i t / c o s t r a t i o which was then maximized. The 
c o r r e l a t i o n s a s s o c i a t e d w i t h A^ are based on t h i s adjus tment . 
2 . The data are not a v a i l a b l e for t h e s e c o r r e l a t i o n s . 
S i g n i f i c a n t a t . 0 0 1 . 
S i g n i f i c a n t a t . 0 5 . 
Reproduced w i t h p e r m i s s i o n o f the authors [ 5 ] . 
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current r e s e a r c h then makes t h i s r e s e a r c h t h a t much s t r o n g e r because of 
the apparent v a l i d i t y o f the model used [ 2 6 ] . 
Summary 
An a b b r e v i a t e d p r e s e n t a t i o n o f the budget a l l o c a t i o n model d e ­
v e l o p e d and used by Baker, Souder, Shumway, Maher, and Rubenste in [ 5 ] , 
and Baker, ejt a l . [4] i s g i v e n h e r e . Also i n c l u d e d are m o d i f i c a t i o n s 
o f the b a s i c model which are needed for t h i s s t u d y . V e r i f i c a t i o n data 
o b t a i n e d by Baker, e t a l . [5 ] in t h e i r c o n t i n u i n g r e s e a r c h w i t h t h i s 
model are a l s o i n c l u d e d . These data show t h a t the model i s an a c c u r a t e 
p r e d i c t i v e mode l . 
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CHAPTER IV 
DESIGN OF THE EXPERIMENT 
Research Ques t ions 
The primary purpose of t h i s r e s e a r c h i s t o i n v e s t i g a t e the e f f e c t s 
o f i n d i v i d u a l s 1 r i s k t o l e r a n c e on the s e l e c t i o n of and budget a l l o c a t i o n 
t o an R & D p o r t f o l i o i n a h i e r a r c h i c a l o r g a n i z a t i o n . The emphasis w i l l 
be p r i m a r i l y on m u l t i - l e v e l d e c i s i o n p r o c e s s e s w i t h i n t h i s h i e r a r c h i c a l 
o r g a n i z a t i o n . Within t h i s g e n e r a l framework, four s p e c i f i c c o n j e c t u r e s 
w i l l be looked a t i n d e t a i l . These c o n j e c t u r e s a r e : 
1 . The number of t a s k s funded by a d e c i s i o n maker i s a f u n c t i o n 
o f t h a t d e c i s i o n maker's r i s k t o l e r a n c e . 
2 . The e x p e c t e d v a l u e (mean) o f the s e l e c t e d p o r t f o l i o w i l l be 
symmetr ica l about k=0. 
3 . The d i f f e r e n c e between the s u p e r o r d i n a t e l e v e l ' s p o r t f o l i o 
and t h e s u b o r d i n a t e l e v e l ' s p o r t f o l i o , as measured by "sum of a b s o l u t e 
d i f f e r e n c e s " and " p o r t f o l i o means ," i s symmetric around | k . ^ 1 = ^* 
4 . The i m p o s i t i o n of a d d i t i o n a l budgetary c o n s t r a i n t s upon the 
s u b o r d i n a t e w i l l b r i n g h i s p o r t f o l i o c l o s e r to t h e s u p e r o r d i n a t e l e v e l ' s 
p o r t f o l i o . 
The remainder of t h i s chapter w i l l be devoted to e x p l a i n i n g how t h e s e 
c o n j e c t u r e s w i l l be s t u d i e d . 
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Use o f the Model 
As the model was o r i g i n a l l y d e s i g n e d and u s e d , the number of l e v e l s 
and t h e number o f e n t i t i e s w i t h i n each l e v e l are v a r i a b l e , up to c e r t a i n 
maximum v a l u e s . These v a r i a b l e s are s p e c i f i e d as input data to the model . 
For t h i s s t u d y , a t w o - l e v e l a d m i n i s t r a t i v e h i e r a r c h y was u s e d , d i v i s i o n s 
and b r a n c h e s . S ince the o b j e c t i s t o s tudy m u l t i - l e v e l d e c i s i o n s , the 
t w o - l e v e l d e c i s i o n p r o c e s s seemed the most l o g i c a l one w i t h which to 
beg in as i t i s the s i m p l e s t o f the m u l t i - l e v e l d e c i s i o n s . I t was a r b i ­
t r a r i l y d e c i d e d t h a t , w i t h i n t h e s e two a d m i n i s t r a t i v e l e v e l s , t h e r e would 
be one d i v i s i o n and t h r e e b r a n c h e s . The a c t i v i t y h i e r a r c h y used i n c l u d e s 
t h r e e l e v e l s . They are programs, p r o j e c t s , and t a s k s , r e s p e c t i v e l y . 
Aga in , by a r b i t r a r y d e c i s i o n , i t was d e c i d e d t h a t t h e r e would be one p r o ­
gram, n i n e p r o j e c t s , and 200 t a s k s . This arrangement a l l owed for f l e x i ­
b i l i t y in the model and a l s o a l lowed f o r enough of a base from which mean­
i n g f u l c o n c l u s i o n s and i n s i g h t s could be drawn. 
The model , i n i t s o r i g i n a l d e s i g n and u s e , f i x e d the d e c i s i o n a t a 
g i v e n l e v e l o f the h i e r a r c h y . In order to add a m u l t i - l e v e l d imens ion , a 
s e q u e n t i a l s o l u t i o n procedure was used i n which o u t p u t s from one s o l u t i o n 
were used as i n p u t s to a new s o l u t i o n . This s e q u e n t i a l procedure i s p r e ­
s e n t e d below s t e p by s t e p and i s f l o w - c h a r t e d i n F igure 6 . 
1 . F i x i n g the b e n e f i t f u n c t i o n a t the s u p e r o r d i n a t e l e v e l and 
p u t t i n g no c o n s t r a i n t s on any b u d g e t s , d i v i s i o n , branch, or t a s k , s o l v e 
the model . From t h i s output one o b t a i n s a p o r t f o l i o ( s e l e c t e d by the 
s u p e r o r d i n a t e l e v e l ) and budgets to a l l e n t i t i e s w i t h i n the o r g a n i z a t i o n . 
2 . Take the budgets o b t a i n e d i n the s u p e r o r d i n a t e l e v e l s o l u t i o n 
of t h e a l g o r i t h m (above) and use them as upper l i m i t s of the budgets to 
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^ T o t a l Budget ^ 
Superord inate Level 
B e n e f i t Funct ion 
S e l e c t e d P o r t f o l i o 
(Superord inate ) 
Subordinate Leve l 
B e n e f i t Funct ion 
Branch, P r o j e c t Budgets 
Model S e l e c t e d P o r t f o l i o (Subordinate ) 
F igure 6 . Flow Diagram D e p i c t i n g the S e q u e n t i a l S o l u t i o n s 
o f the Model 
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c o r r e s p o n d i n g o r g a n i z a t i o n a l e n t i t i e s i n the subord inate l e v e l s o l u t i o n . 
A l s o , change the b e n e f i t f u n c t i o n t o t h a t o f the subord ina te l e v e l . 
Reso lve the mode l . As o u t p u t , we aga in g e t a p o r t f o l i o . This p o r t f o l i o 
i s a r e s u l t o f the m u l t i - l e v e l d e c i s i o n p r o c e s s and w i l l be compared to 
t h a t p o r t f o l i o s e l e c t e d by the s u p e r o r d i n a t e l e v e l . I t i s from t h e s e 
comparisons t h a t c o n c l u s i o n s concern ing the m u l t i - l e v e l d e c i s i o n p r o c e s s 
w i l l be i n f e r r e d . 
In s t e p 2 , the r e s o l u t i o n of the model u s i n g the b e n e f i t f u n c t i o n 
of the s u b o r d i n a t e l e v e l , the budgets which can be passed from the super ­
o r d i n a t e l e v e l s o l u t i o n are branch , p r o j e c t , and t a s k . In t h i s s t u d y , 
both branch and p r o j e c t budgets w i l l be passed from one s o l u t i o n to the 
o t h e r , but t a s k budgets w i l l n o t . Were t h i s done , the subord ina te l e v e l 
s o l u t i o n , by the nature of the budgets or c o n s t r a i n t s , would be l i m i t e d 
to o n l y one f e a s i b l e s o l u t i o n : the same s o l u t i o n o b t a i n e d in s t e p 1 . 
Thus, no use would be served by p a s s i n g t a s k c o n s t r a i n t s from the super ­
o r d i n a t e l e v e l s o l u t i o n to the m u l t i - l e v e l s o l u t i o n . 
Method and I n d i c e s o f P o r t f o l i o Comparison 
The o b j e c t i v e o f t h i s r e s e a r c h i s to determine the e f f e c t s o f a 
d e c i s i o n maker's r i s k t o l e r a n c e on the p o r t f o l i o he s e l e c t s . Moreover, 
i t i s d e s i r e d t o look a t t h e s e e f f e c t s as they apply to d e c i s i o n s made in 
a h i e r a r c h i c a l o r g a n i z a t i o n . The main t h r u s t o f the r e s e a r c h i s then on 
the comparison of p o r t f o l i o s and the de terminat ion o f the "amount" by 
which they d i f f e r . This i s p a r t i c u l a r l y c r u c i a l in the c a s e o f the m u l t i -
person d e c i s i o n s and s p e c i f i c a l l y i n the t e s t i n g of c o n j e c t u r e s 3 and 4 . 
In t h e s e c a s e s , i t i s d e s i r e d to compare the p o r t f o l i o s e l e c t e d by the 
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s u p e r o r d i n a t e to t h a t s e l e c t e d by the subord ina te who has been i n f l u e n c e d 
by t h e s u p e r o r d i n a t e . R e c a l l i n g t h a t the model i s s o l v e d s e q u e n t i a l l y , 
f i r s t for the s u p e r o r d i n a t e and then for the s u b o r d i n a t e , we then have 
the two p o r t f o l i o s needed f o r comparison r e a d i l y a v a i l a b l e . 
No s i n g l e i n d e x or number was found which c h a r a c t e r i z e d the d i f f e r ­
e n c e s i n p o r t f o l i o s when they were compared. T h e r e f o r e , a number of 
i n d i c e s w i l l be u s e d . These i n d i c e s when c o n s i d e r e d t o g e t h e r do g i v e a 
complete p i c t u r e of the d i f f e r e n c e s in the p o r t f o l i o s . One of the i n ­
d i c e s t o be used i s the number of t a s k s s e l e c t e d (funded) in each p o r t ­
f o l i o . This i n d e x w i l l p o i n t up s i t u a t i o n s in which one d e c i s i o n maker 
funds a p a r t i c u l a r t a s k and the o t h e r does n o t . Moreover, t h i s i n d e x i s 
needed t o o b t a i n r e s u l t s for the t e s t i n g of the f i r s t c o n j e c t u r e . The 
second i n d e x t o be used w i l l be the mean and v a r i a n c e o f the s e l e c t e d 
p o r t f o l i o s . S ince a l l t a s k s c o n s i d e r e d in t h i s s tudy are independent by 
a s s u m p t i o n , the mean of the p o r t f o l i o w i l l mere ly be the sum of the means 
o f the t a s k s a t the funding l e v e l s a t which they are s e l e c t e d . The same 
w i l l be t r u e for the v a r i a n c e s . The use of t h i s index w i l l show d i f f e r ­
e n c e s in the r i s k i n e s s o f the s e l e c t e d p o r t f o l i o s as w e l l as d i f f e r e n c e s 
in t h e i r e x p e c t e d v a l u e s . The f i n a l index to be used w i l l be the sum of 
a b s o l u t e d i f f e r e n c e s . This index w i l l be i n d i c a t e d by the a b b r e v i a t i o n 
SAD. This index w i l l compare the two p o r t f o l i o s t a sk by t a s k . I f the 
s u p e r o r d i n a t e and subord ina te d i f f e r on t h e i r funding a l l o c a t i o n s to a 
p a r t i c u l a r t a s k , the a b s o l u t e v a l u e of t h a t d i f f e r e n c e w i l l be n o t e d . 
This i n c l u d e s t a s k s s e l e c t e d by one and not the o t h e r . This comparison 
w i l l be made f o r each of the t a s k s in both p o r t f o l i o s . These a b s o l u t e 
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d i f f e r e n c e s w i l l then be summed and t h i s sum (SAD) w i l l then be used as 
an i n d e x . The v a l u e o f t h i s index i s t h a t i t a l l o w s a s i n g l e number to 
be a t t a c h e d to a t a s k by t a s k comparison of the p o r t f o l i o s . This w i l l 
show d i f f e r e n c e s in the p o r t f o l i o s do e x i s t even i f both fund the same 
t a s k s e x a c t l y . 
Data 
The model r e q u i r e s b e n e f i t judgments and budgets as input d a t a . 
In order to o p e r a t e , the model r e q u i r e s one o t h e r p i e c e of i n f o r m a t i o n . 
This o t h e r r e q u i r e d in format ion i s t a s k d a t a . The model r e q u i r e s a pool 
o f t a s k s and a s s o c i a t e d b e n e f i t judgments , or in the c a s e of the mod i f i ed 
model , e s t i m a t e s o f the mean and v a r i a n c e of each t a s k a t each of t h r e e 
funding l e v e l s ; z e r o , minimum, and maximum. The minimum and maximum 
funding l e v e l s must a l s o be s p e c i f i e d . The reason that the modi f i ed model 
on ly r e q u i r e s e s t i m a t e s o f the mean and v a r i a n c e of t a s k r e t u r n s a t each 
funding l e v e l i s t h a t , in the mod i f i ed model , the c a l c u l a t i o n of b e n e f i t 
i s accompl i shed by the model from t h e s e d a t a . 
In t h i s s t u d y , t h e r e are two s e t s of data which are u n i n t e r e s t i n g 
as the r e s u l t s which would be o b t a i n e d from the use of t h e s e s e t s o f data 
are p r e d i c t a b l e . One of t h e s e s e t s of data i s data i n which a l l the t a s k 
means are so l a r g e t h a t they always overshadow the t a s k v a r i a n c e s . A 
d e c i s i o n maker o p e r a t i n g on data of t h i s type would c o n s i s t e n t l y choose 
the t a s k s w i t h the l a r g e s t means, no mat ter what h i s r i s k t o l e r a n c e i s . 
The o t h e r type of data i s data in which the v a r i a n c e s are so l a r g e that 
they overpower the means o f of the t a s k s . With data of t h i s t y p e , any 
d e c i s i o n maker w i l l choose the h igh mean-high v a r i a n c e t a s k s . The 
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e x p e c t a t i o n - v a r i a n c e formula t ion of e x p e c t e d u t i l i t y i s the reason for 
the above b e h a v i o r . R e c a l l t h a t , i n t h i s f o r m u l a t i o n , the e x p e c t e d 
u t i l i t y i s equal to the mean minus some f r a c t i o n a l m u l t i p l e o f the 
v a r i a n c e . Thus, i n t a s k s where the mean dominates the v a r i a n c e , the 
t a s k s w i l l be s e l e c t e d on the b a s i s o f t h e i r means. In the c a s e s where 
the v a r i a n c e d o m i n a t e s , the t a s k s s e l e c t e d w i l l be t h o s e w i t h the l a r g e s t 
means and v a r i a n c e s . 
For t h i s s t u d y , i t was d e s i r e d t h a t the data used not be w h o l l y 
o f e i t h e r type d e s c r i b e d above. The d e s i r e d data would have the property 
t h a t sometimes the mean would dominate , sometimes the v a r i a n c e , and some­
t imes they would j u s t trade o f f . I t i s t h i s type of data which i s used 
in the r e s e a r c h . 
Generat ion of the Data 
The data used i n the r e s e a r c h were randomly g e n e r a t e d . A base of 
200 t a s k s was g e n e r a t e d and then the d e c i s i o n l e v e l opera ted upon t h i s 
200 t a s k b a s e . D i f f e r e n t parameters of the d e c i s i o n maker or h i s f e a s i b l e 
s o l u t i o n s e t were v a r i e d in the d i f f e r e n t e x p e r i m e n t s . 
The method used for g e n e r a t i n g the data was t o s e t an i n t e r v a l on 
which the v a l u e s o f a p a r t i c u l a r parameter o f the data cou ld range . This 
i n t e r v a l was then looked upon as a uniform d i s t r i b u t i o n of the p o s s i b l e 
v a l u e s of t h a t parameter . R e a l i z a t i o n s of t h i s d i s t r i b u t i o n were then 
s e l e c t e d randomly by the use o f a 0 -1 random number genera tor [ 2 2 ] . 
The data parameters s p e c i f i e d in t h i s maneuver were the minimum funding 
l e v e l , t h e mean a t the minimum funding l e v e l , and the v a r i a n c e at the 
minimum funding l e v e l for each of the 200 t a s k s . 
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To o b t a i n the v a l u e s for the maximum funding l e v e l , the mean a t 
maximum funding and the v a r i a n c e a t maximum funding , a s l i g h t l y d i f f e r e n t 
method was u s e d . An incrementa l range was s p e c i f i e d for each o f t h e s e 
parameters . This range was then c o n s i d e r e d to be a uniform d i s t r i b u t i o n 
of the p o s s i b l e v a l u e s for t h e s e parameters . A r e a l i z a t i o n of t h e s e i n ­
crements was then randomly made by use of the 0 -1 random number g e n e r a t o r . 
The increment chosen for a p a r t i c u l a r parameter was then added t o i t s 
correspond ing v a l u e a t the minimum funding l e v e l . 
A b r i e f example may h e l p to c l a r i f y t h i s procedure . Let us suppose 
t h a t the range of minimum funding l e v e l s i s uniform on the i n t e r v a l 100-
200 . Let us f u r t h e r suppose t h a t a random r e a l i z a t i o n of t h i s d i s t r i b u ­
t i o n i s 179 . In o t h e r words , the minimum funding l e v e l of the task under 
c o n s i d e r a t i o n i s 179 . We now want to f ind the maximum funding l e v e l for 
t h i s t a s k . Assume t h a t the i n c r e m e n t a l funding v a l u e s are uni formly d i s ­
t r i b u t e d a long the i n t e r v a l 5 0 - 1 0 0 . Let us f u r t h e r assume t h a t a random 
r e a l i z a t i o n of t h i s d i s t r i b u t i o n i s 6 1 . The maximum funding l e v e l for 
t h i s t a s k i s then the minimum funding l e v e l p lus the funding increment or 
179 + 61 which i s 240 . This p r o c e s s i s f o l l o w e d for each of the parameters 
which must be s p e c i f i e d for each o f the 200 t a s k s in the data b a s e . 
Table 2 g i v e s the ranges o f the v a l u e s for a l l parameters of the data 
u s e d . 
Table 2 . Ranges o f Parameters o f the Data Used in the Study 
Parameters Range a t Range a t Range a t 














Two o t h e r parameters a l s o had to be s p e c i f i e d for each t a s k . These were 
to which p r o j e c t the t a s k b e l o n g e d , and to which branch the t a s k b e l o n g e d . 
As t h e r e are n i n e p r o j e c t s , the t a s k s were randomly a s s i g n e d to one of 
the n i n e p r o j e c t s so t h a t they were uni formly d i s t r i b u t e d among the pro­
j e c t s . This r e s u l t e d in each p r o j e c t c o n t a i n i n g approx imate ly the same 
number of t a s k s s i n c e the t a s k s were d i s t r i b u t e d among p r o j e c t s by a u n i ­
form d i s t r i b u t o r . The same procedure was f o l l o w e d for a s s i g n i n g the 
t a s k s among the t h r e e b r a n c h e s . One f u r t h e r parameter had to be s p e c i ­
f i e d . This was to which branch each p r o j e c t b e l o n g e d . This was done 
a r b i t r a r i l y s i n c e the on ly purpose o f t h i s i s to a l l o w comple t ion of the 
network and no e f f e c t s on the r e s u l t s cou ld be caused by t h i s a r b i t r a r y 
a s s i g n m e n t . The ass ignment was t h a t p r o j e c t s 1 , 2 , and 3 be longed to 
branch 1; p r o j e c t s 4 , 5 , and 6 to branch 2 ; and p r o j e c t s 7, 8 , and 9 to 
branch 3 . 
Summary 
The r e s e a r c h q u e s t i o n s to be answered are p r e s e n t e d in t h i s chap­
t e r . This i n c l u d e s the manner in which the model i s to be u s e d , the 
n a t u r e and v a l u e s o f the data u s e d , the measures of p o r t f o l i o s i m i l a r i t y 




Review of the Model 
The model in i t s o r i g i n a l form w i l l s o l v e the s e l e c t i o n and 
a l l o c a t i o n problem for one l e v e l o f an o r g a n i z a t i o n . This i s accom­
p l i s h e d by s p e c i f y i n g the o b j e c t i v e or b e n e f i t e s t i m a t i o n model to be 
used i n t h a t s o l u t i o n . For use in t h i s r e s e a r c h , the model w i l l be 
used in a s e q u e n t i a l manner i n order to a c h i e v e the property o f a m u l t i ­
l e v e l o r g a n i z a t i o n , which i s so n e c e s s a r y to t h i s work. 
The f i r s t s t e p in t h i s s e q u e n t i a l p r o c e s s i s to s o l v e the model 
u s i n g the s u p e r o r d i n a t e 1 s b e n e f i t f u n c t i o n . The on ly o t h e r in format ion 
g iven i s the t o t a l budget w i th which he has to work. From t h i s s o l u t i o n 
o f the model , a p o r t f o l i o o f t a s k s to be funded and the funding l e v e l s 
for t h e s e t a s k s are o b t a i n e d . R e c a l l tha t each t a s k i s a s s o c i a t e d w i th 
one and on ly one branch and w i t h one and on ly one p r o j e c t . 
N e x t , from t h i s s o l u t i o n of the model , branch and p r o j e c t budgets 
can be o b t a i n e d . R e c a l l that t h e s e budgets become c o n s t r a i n t s in the 
next s o l u t i o n of the model . These budgets are then communicated to the 
s u b o r d i n a t e l e v e l for use in a subsequent s o l u t i o n of the model . By 
summing the funding l e v e l s o f a l l t a s k s funded (by the s u p e r o r d i n a t e ) 
w i t h i n a branch, a budget for t h a t branch i s o b t a i n e d : 
B, = E i V b 
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where = branch budget for branch b 
& t = funding of t a s k t when s u p e r o r d i n a t e 1 s b e n e f i t f u n c t i o n s are 
u t i l i z e d 
b = s e t of a l l t a s k s i n branch b. 
This branch budget i s then the budget which the s u p e r o r d i n a t e l e v e l com­
munica te s to t h a t branch. This i s done for a l l branches so tha t each 
branch has i t s own budget . This same s o r t o f c a l c u l a t i o n i s c a r r i e d out 
for each p r o j e c t in the a c t i v i t y h i e r a r c h y . By summing over a l l t a s k s 
b e l o n g i n g to a p a r t i c u l a r p r o j e c t , a p r o j e c t budget can be c a l c u l a t e d : 
B = E £ W p P - — t tep 
where B^ = budget o f p r o j e c t p 
x f c = funding of task t when s u p e r o r d i n a t e 1 s b e n e f i t f u n c t i o n s 
are used 
p = s e t o f a l l t a s k s in p r o j e c t p . 
Once t h e s e budgets have been o b t a i n e d , the nex t s t e p in the sequence can 
commence. 
I t now must be dec ided which of t h e s e b u d g e t s , or c o n s t r a i n t s , are 
to be communicated to the subord ina te l e v e l . In some c a s e s o n l y branch 
budgets are communicated and in o t h e r s both branch and p r o j e c t c o n s t r a i n t s 
are communicated from the s u p e r o r d i n a t e l e v e l t o the subord inate l e v e l . 
These budgets are communicated as c o n s t r a i n t s by i n p u t t i n g them as upper 
bounds to the r e s p e c t i v e branch or p r o j e c t in the second s o l u t i o n of the 
mode l . 
The second s o l u t i o n of the model i s the f i n a l s t e p of t h i s s equence . 
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The o b j e c t i v e f u n c t i o n used i s tha t of the subord ina te l e v e l . The appro­
p r i a t e c o n s t r a i n t s from the s u p e r o r d i n a t e l e v e l or f i r s t s o l u t i o n of the 
model are a l s o a p p l i e d for t h i s s o l u t i o n . I t i s the a p p l i c a t i o n of t h e s e 
c o n s t r a i n t s which adds the m u l t i - l e v e l c a p a b i l i t y t o the model . The 
p o r t f o l i o o b t a i n e d from t h i s second s o l u t i o n can then be compared to the 
p o r t f o l i o o b t a i n e d from the f i r s t s o l u t i o n and comparisons can be made. 
I t i s through t h e s e comparisons t h a t i n s i g h t s can be g a i n e d . 
The E f f e c t s o f C o n s t r a i n t s 
When c o n s t r a i n t s are imposed on the model , as was d i s c u s s e d in 
the p r e v i o u s s e c t i o n , the problem goes from a s i n g l e d e c i s i o n problem to 
some number of independent d e c i s i o n problems which must be s o l v e d . This 
number i s equal to the number of branch and/or p r o j e c t budgets which are 
imposed upon the mode l . Two b a s i c outcomes can r e s u l t when t h e s e budgets 
are communicated. One outcome i s tha t the c o n s t r a i n t , the budget from 
the s u p e r o r d i n a t e l e v e l , i s g r e a t e r than the amount which would have been 
a l l o c a t e d to t h a t branch or p r o j e c t i f the model were s o l v e d w i t h super­
o r d i n a t e b e n e f i t f u n c t i o n s and no c o n s t r a i n t s on the branch (or p r o j e c t ) . 
The second event i s that the c o n s t r a i n t i s l e s s than t h a t which would have 
been a l l o c a t e d by an u n c o n s t r a i n e d model w i t h subord inate b e n e f i t func ­
t i o n s . Each o f t h e s e outcomes can cause two d i f f e r e n t behav ior p a t t e r n s 
i n the model . 
I f the imposed budget i s g r e a t e r than would have been a l l o c a t e d 
by the u n c o n s t r a i n e d subord ina te model , the a d d i t i o n a l funds made a v a i l ­
a b l e by the imposed budget w i l l be used s i n c e r e t u r n s are n o n - d e c r e a s i n g . 
The funds can be used to fund a d d i t i o n a l t a s k s which would not be funded 
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w i t h i n t h a t branch or p r o j e c t had the e x t r a funding not been a v a i l a b l e 
and/or to i n c r e a s e the funding of the t a s k s a l r e a d y funded. These two 
behav ior p a t t e r n s are not mutua l ly e x c l u s i v e and some combinat ion of both 
b e h a v i o r s can be used t o exhaus t the budget . The o b j e c t i v e f u n c t i o n o f 
the d e c i s i o n l e v e l w i l l be the de termin ing f a c t o r as to how much o f the 
a d d i t i o n a l funds are spend i n each manner. The b a s i s for de termin ing 
how t h e s e a d d i t i o n a l funds w i l l be a l l o c a t e d i s i n c r e m e n t a l r e t u r n . The 
p r e c i s e method of how t h i s works w i l l be deve loped i n the next s e c t i o n . 
Two t y p e s of behav ior a l s o are p o s s i b l e when the communicated 
budget i s s m a l l e r than would have been determined by the u n c o n s t r a i n e d 
s u b o r d i n a t e model . These b e h a v i o r s are the con verse of the behav iors seen 
in the p r e v i o u s paragraph. When faced w i t h the problem o f a l l o c a t i n g 
l e s s funds w i t h i n a branch or p r o j e c t than i t would w i t h an unreduced 
budge t , the model , as one a l t e r n a t i v e , can fund fewer t a s k s , e . g . , not 
fund some t a s k s t h a t i t normal ly would fund i f i t had an u n c o n s t r a i n e d 
branch or p r o j e c t budget . The o t h e r a l t e r n a t i v e i s to fund the same 
t a s k s as i t would have had the budget not been decremented, but to fund 
t h e s e t a s k s a t reduced l e v e l s . Aga in , the model can employ both a l t e r n a ­
t i v e s w i t h i n a g iven p r o j e c t or branch. The d e t e r m i n i n g f a c t o r i s i n ­
crementa l r e t u r n . The model w i l l choose t h a t a l t e r n a t i v e or combinat ion 
o f a l t e r n a t i v e s which w i l l reduce i t s b e n e f i t e s t i m a t e the l e a s t , j u s t 
as in the p r e v i o u s c a s e i t would choose the course of a c t i o n or combina­
t i o n of c o u r s e s o f a c t i o n which would i n c r e a s e i t s b e n e f i t e s t i m a t e the 
m o s t . 
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The Algor i thm 
As was e x p l a i n e d , the a l g o r i t h m used to s o l v e t h i s network model 
i s the o u t - o f - k i l t e r a l g o r i t h m . This a l g o r i t h m u s e s an i t e r a t i v e s o l u ­
t i o n procedure . I t i s t h i s i t e r a t i v e procedure which can be used to 
e x p l a i n the b e h a v i o r of the model under c o n d i t i o n s o f i n c r e a s e d and d e ­
c r e a s e d b u d g e t s . 
The model s e l e c t s t a s k s for funding and s e t s the l e v e l o f funding 
based upon the b e n e f i t e s t i m a t i o n ba lanced a g a i n s t the e x p e n d i t u r e . In 
an u n c o n s t r a i n e d env ironment , the model s e l e c t s f i r s t t h a t t a s k and the 
l e v e l o f funding for t h a t t a s k which y i e l d s the b e s t o v e r a l l b e n e f i t 
per d o l l a r a l l o c a t e d . The model then scans a l l remaining t a s k s and c o n ­
t i n u e s to s e l e c t t a s k s and fund them i n a d e c r e a s i n g order o f b e n e f i t per 
d o l l a r a l l o c a t e d . This p r o c e s s c o n t i n u e s u n t i l e i t h e r a l l t a s k s have 
been s e l e c t e d and funded or the budget has been e x h a u s t e d . Given the 
s i t u a t i o n d e s c r i b e d in the preced ing s e c t i o n i n which the budget communi­
c a t e d from the s u p e r o r d i n a t e l e v e l t o the subord ina te l e v e l i s g r e a t e r 
than the u n c o n s t r a i n e d subord ina te a l l o c a t i o n , i t i s the i t e r a t i v e nature 
o f the s o l u t i o n procedure which e x p l a i n s how t h e s e e x t r a funds are a l l o ­
c a t e d . A f t e r s e l e c t i n g and funding t h o s e t a s k s which i t would i f i t were 
not c o n s t r a i n e d , the model then looks a t the incrementa l b e n e f i t to be 
ga ined from funding each o f the remaining t a s k s . I t a l s o looks at the 
i n c r e m e n t a l b e n e f i t t o be gained from i n c r e a s i n g the funding o f any t a s k 
which has been p r e v i o u s l y funded. This incrementa l b e n e f i t e s t i m a t i o n 
i s based on the o b j e c t i v e or b e n e f i t - e s t i m a t i o n f u n c t i o n used in t h e 
s o l u t i o n procedure . The model then s e l e c t s t h a t t a s k to fund (or i n c r e a s e 
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t h e funding l e v e l o f some p r e v i o u s l y funded t a s k ) which has the b e s t i n ­
crementa l b e n e f i t . The model c o n t i n u e s in t h i s manner u n t i l a l l a v a i l ­
a b l e funds have been committed to t a s k s . 
The a c t i o n s o f the model when o p e r a t i n g under reduced budgets are 
a l s o e x p l i c a b l e by i t s i t e r a t i v e n a t u r e . When a subord inate l e v e l s eeks 
to determine i t s p o r t f o l i o and has had a branch or p r o j e c t budget commun­
i c a t e d to i t from the s u p e r o r d i n a t e l e v e l which i s s m a l l e r than i t would 
i t s e l f have a l l o c a t e d to t h a t branch or p r o j e c t , the model r e a c t s in one 
or both o f the ways d e s c r i b e d i n the p r e v i o u s s e c t i o n . The model , based 
upon the b e n e f i t - e s t i m a t i n g f u n c t i o n i t i s u s i n g , d e v e l o p s a p r i o r i t y 
l i s t for the funding of t a s k s , and at what l e v e l s t o fund them. That i s 
to s a y , i t f i r s t funds t h a t t a s k a t the l e v e l which y i e l d s the g r e a t e s t 
b e n e f i t . The model c o n t i n u e s to fund t a s k s a t the l e v e l which y i e l d s 
the g r e a t e s t b e n e f i t per d o l l a r in a d e c r e a s i n g order of b e n e f i t / d o l l a r 
u n t i l a l l funds w i t h i n a g iven branch or p r o j e c t are a l l o c a t e d . In t h i s 
c a s e o f a decremented budget , the model w i l l fund t a s k s in the same manner 
as b e f o r e , but i t has l e s s money to a l l o c a t e . The r e s u l t i s t h a t fewer 
t a s k s are funded and a d d i t i o n a l t a s k s are funded a t reduced l e v e l s from 
what the s u b o r d i n a t e l e v e l might o t h e r w i s e have d e s i r e d . 
The Conjec tures 
The r e s u l t s o f t h i s s tudy can be broken down i n t o two c l a s s i f i c a ­
t i o n s : (1) t h o s e r e s u l t s d e a l i n g w i t h s i n g l e l e v e l d e c i s i o n p r o c e s s e s ; 
and (2) t h o s e r e s u l t s d e a l i n g w i t h m u l t i - l e v e l d e c i s i o n p r o c e s s e s . These 
r e s u l t s w i l l be d i s c u s s e d in the remainder of t h i s c h a p t e r . F i r s t , how­
e v e r , a n o t e about the u s e , or l ack t h e r e o f , of s t a t i s t i c s i n t h i s work. 
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The nature of this work i s exploratory. I t s goals were to gain 
insights into an extremely complex process. I t was fel t that, due to 
the nature of the data used, many of these insights and trends may not 
have been s t a t i s t i c a l l y significant . Thus, had s t a t i s t i c a l tes ts been 
the c r i t e r i a , many interesting and important resul ts may have been missed. 
In any subsequent study of some of the insights gained from this work, 
s t a t i s t i c a l tes ts may be mandatory in order to fully explore and under­
stand the insight, but in this research, they may have tended to mask more 
than they helped to uncover. 
The f i r s t c lass of results to be discussed will be those dealing 
with single level decision processes. There are two conjectures of this 
type which were examined. They are: 
1. The number of tasks funded by a decision level i s a function 
of that decision l eve l ' s r isk tolerance. 
2 . The expected value (mean) of the selected portfolio will be 
symmetric about k=0. 
This f i r s t conjecture simply says that the r isk tolerance of a 
decision level in some way affects the total number of tasks funded by 
that decision level . The results of this study support this conjecture. 
These resul ts show that the more risk tolerant the decision level , the 
greater the number of tasks i t funded. The results are shown in Table 3 
and Figure 7. For this to happen means that the r isk intolerant decision 
level funded tasks at higher levels than did the r isk tolerant decision 
level . 
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Table 3 . Number of Tasks Funded i n P o r t f o l i o 
by a S i n g l e Level D e c i s i o n Proces s 
w i t h Risk T o l e r a n c e , k 
Risk Tolerance (k) No. Tasks Funded 
1.0 120 
0 . 5 129 
0 . 1 130 
0 132 
- 0 . 1 133 
- 0 . 5 139 
- 1 . 0 144 
R e c a l l i n g the form of the e x p e c t a t i o n - v a r i a n c e b e n e f i t e s t i m a t i n g 
f u n c t i o n , one can s e e t h a t the manner in which ta sk means and v a r i a n c e s 
change w i t h funding l e v e l p l a y s an important r o l e in de termin ing at which 
l e v e l a t a s k w i l l be funded. I t i s v e r y p o s s i b l e , due to the nature of 
the data u s e d , t h a t when i n c r e a s i n g the funding l e v e l of a t a s k , the i n ­
c r e a s e in the t a s k mean w i l l o f f s e t any change i n t a s k v a r i a n c e . I f 
t h i s i s the c a s e , then the r i s k i n t o l e r a n t d e c i s i o n l e v e l w i l l p r e f e r to 
fund a t the h i g h e r l e v e l s a lmost a l l o f the t i m e , w h i l e the r i s k i n t o l e r ­
ant d e c i s i o n l e v e l w i l l p r e f e r the reduced funding l e v e l s . E a r l i e r i n 
t h i s c h a p t e r , the i t e r a t i v e nature of the model was d i s c u s s e d . Another 
p o s s i b l e reason f o r the behav ior noted here i s the na ture of the data 
u s e d . R e f e r r i n g back to Table 2 , one can see t h a t , a t the maximum funding 
l e v e l , the v a r i a n c e o f the task re turn w i l l d e c r e a s e from the v a r i a n c e 
a t the minimum funding l e v e l approx imate ly 50 percent o f the t i m e . The 
t a s k s where the v a r i a n c e d e c r e a s e s a t maximum funding l e v e l s become e x ­
tremely a t t r a c t i v e to the r i s k t o l e r a n t d e c i s i o n maker a t t h i s i n c r e a s e d 
funding l e v e l . C o n v e r s e l y , t h e s e t a s k s which may be a t t r a c t i v e to the 
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r i s k t o l e r a n t d e c i s i o n maker at the minimum funding l e v e l , become l e s s 
a t t r a c t i v e a t the maximum funding l e v e l . The above property of the 
d a t a , t h e b e n e f i t f u n c t i o n u s e d , and r e c a l l i n g t h i s e a r l i e r d i s c u s s i o n , 
i t now becomes r e a s o n a b l e to e x p e c t the model to g i v e the r e s u l t s t h a t 
i t h a s . 
The second c o n j e c t u r e about s i n g l e l e v e l d e c i s i o n p r o c e s s e s d e a l s 
w i t h the p o r t f o l i o e x p e c t e d v a l u e s . The c o n j e c t u r e says t h a t the e x ­
p e c t e d v a l u e s of the p o r t f o l i o s w i l l be symmetrical about k=0. The r e ­
s u l t s do not f u l l y support t h i s c o n j e c t u r e . The p o r t f o l i o w i t h the 
h i g h e s t e x p e c t e d v a l u e had k = - 0 . 1 . Moreover, the p o r t f o l i o w i t h k=0.5 
had a h i g h e r e x p e c t e d v a l u e than d id the p o r t f o l i o w i t h k = - 0 . 5 . The 
same was t r u e for the p o r t f o l i o w i t h k = - 1 . 0 as i t had a g r e a t e r e x p e c t e d 
v a l u e than the p o r t f o l i o chosen w i t h k=1.0 ( s e e Table 4 and Figure 8 ) . 
Table 4 . P o r t f o l i o Expected Values for the 
D i f f e r i n g k L e v e l s 
k P o r t f o l i o Expected Value 
1.0 182663 
0 . 5 190952 
0 . 1 191724 
0 191916 
- 0 . 1 192087 
- 0 . 5 189959 
- 1 . 0 185254 
However, t h e s e r e s u l t s are e x p l i c a b l e . R e c a l l from an e a r l i e r 
c h a p t e r t h a t the model i s a s u b o p t i m i z a t i o n model . I t r e q u i r e s c e r t a i n 
forms o f b e n e f i t f u n c t i o n s to be approximated i n order f o r the a l g o r i t h m 
to be e f f e c t i v e . Not ing t h a t the r e s u l t s are c l o s e to showing the con-
195,000 
Figure 8 . P o r t f o l i o Expected Value v s . Inherent Risk Factor (k) 
0 0 
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j e c t u r e d symmetry. The d e v i a t i o n s shown can be a t t r i b u t e d to t h e s e ap­
p r o x i m a t i o n s . Another p o s s i b l e cause of t h e s e d e v i a t i o n s would be the 
manner i n which the data were g e n e r a t e d . 
However, i f t h e s e do not e x p l a i n the d e v i a t i o n s from the e x p e c t e d 
symmetry, then the r e s u l t s i n d i c a t e t h a t the b e n e f i t e s t i m a t i o n based on 
r i s k t o l e r a n c e or r i s k i n t o l e r a n c e was more s e n s i t i v e to p o r t f o l i o e x ­
p e c t a t i o n s . One cou ld then conc lude t h a t whichever r i s k t o l e r a n c e s i t u a ­
t i o n was favored by the b e n e f i t formulat ion was l e s s dependent on task 
v a r i a n c e than the o t h e r . This would f o r c e the d e f i n i t i o n of a new param­
e t e r , o t h e r than v a r i a n c e , to i n d i c a t e t a s k r i s k i n e s s . 
The o t h e r r e s u l t s drawn from t h i s s tudy concern m u l t i - l e v e l d e c i ­
s i o n s . The two c o n j e c t u r e s d e a l i n g w i t h m u l t i - l e v e l d e c i s i o n s re searched 
a r e : 
3 . The d i f f e r e n c e between the subord ina te l e v e l ' s p o r t f o l i o and 
the s u p e r o r d i n a t e l e v e l ' s p o r t f o l i o i s symmetric about | k ^ - k 2 | = 0 , where 
k^ i s the s u p e r o r d i n a t e l e v e l ' s r i s k t o l e r a n c e and i s the subord inate 
l e v e l ' s r i s k t o l e r a n c e . 
4 . The i m p o s i t i o n of a d d i t i o n a l budgetary c o n s t r a i n t s upon the 
s u b o r d i n a t e l e v e l by the s u p e r o r d i n a t e l e v e l w i l l br ing h i s p o r t f o l i o 
c l o s e r to the s u p e r o r d i n a t e l e v e l ' s p o r t f o l i o . 
Before go ing i n t o t h e s e r e s u l t s in d e t a i l , some comments about the s e n ­
s i t i v i t y of the model w i t h r e s p e c t to d i f f e r e n c e s of v a l u e s of the r i s k 
p r o p e n s i t y on d i f f e r e n t l e v e l s are c a l l e d f o r . The r i s k t o l e r a n c e s e t ­
t i n g s f o r both s u p e r o r d i n a t e and subord inate l e v e l s are shown i n Table 5 . 
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Table 5. S e t s of Superordinate (k^) and Subordinate (k^) L e v e l s 
o f Risk Tolerance to Determine Model S e n s i t i v i t y 





















The r e s u l t s of t h i s s e n s i t i v i t y t e s t show t h a t the model i s s e n s i ­
t i v e to d i f f e r e n c e s o f .05 or g r e a t e r for the g iven data s e t . The model 
cannot d i f f e r e n t i a t e between v a l u e s o f l e s s than .05 and t h e p o r t f o l i o s 
which r e s u l t from the s i n g l e l e v e l s u p e r o r d i n a t e p r o c e s s and the m u l t i ­
l e v e l p r o c e s s are i d e n t i c a l . Table 6 and F i g u r e s 9 and 10 summarize 
t h e s e r e s u l t s . 
These r e s u l t s a l s o show t h a t , a s the a b s o l u t e d i f f e r e n c e in r i s k 
t o l e r a n c e v a l u e s between s u p e r o r d i n a t e and subord ina te d e c r e a s e s , so do 
the p o r t f o l i o s chosen by the d e c i s i o n p r o c e s s e s u s i n g the b e n e f i t e s t i ­
mat ions o f t h e r e s p e c t i v e l e v e l s . The s e n s i t i v i t y l i m i t o f a .05 a b s o ­
l u t e d i f f e r e n c e in r i s k t o l e r a n c e i s s u f f i c i e n t for the g iven s e t of 
data to a l l o w t h e i n v e s t i g a t i o n of the c o n j e c t u r e s concern ing the m u l t i ­
l e v e l d e c i s i o n p r o c e s s e s . These c o n j e c t u r e s w i l l now be d i s c u s s e d . 
The f i r s t o f the m u l t i - l e v e l d e c i s i o n p r o c e s s c o n j e c t u r e s d e a l s 
w i t h d i f f e r e n c e s in r i s k t o l e r a n c e between l e v e l s . I t s t a t e s t h a t the 
d i f f e r e n c e between p o r t f o l i o s should be symmetric w i t h r e s p e c t to the 
d i f f e r e n c e between t h e r i s k t o l e r a n c e v a l u e s of the d i f f e r e n t l e v e l s . 
This i s to say t h a t the d i f f e r e n c e between the s i n g l e l e v e l s u p e r o r d i n a t e 
p o r t f o l i o w i t h k^ and wi th m u l t i - l e v e l s u p e r o r d i n a t e - s u b o r d i n a t e p o r t f o l i o 
chosen w i t h k^ and k ^ , r e s p e c t i v e l y , w i l l be the same as the d i f f e r e n c e 
between the s i n g l e l e v e l s u p e r o r d i n a t e p o r t f o l i o chosen w i t h k ^ and the 
m u l t i - l e v e l s u p e r o r d i n a t e - s u b o r d i n a t e p o r t f o l i o chosen w i t h k ^ and k^, 
r e s p e c t i v e l y . The v a l u e s o f k^ and k ^ used to e v a l u a t e t h i s c o n j e c t u r e 
are p r e s e n t e d i n Table 7. 
The r e s u l t s as shown i n Table 8 do not support t h i s c o n j e c t u r e 
Table 6 . Number of Tasks Funded w i t h Subordinate Risk Tolerance Level 
k 9 a t A s s o c i a t e d Superord inate Risk Tolerance Level k 1 
Risk Tolerance Level k = 1.00 k? = .80 k„ = .90 k = .95 k„ = .99 
Number Tasks Funded 120 126 124 123 120 
Risk Tolerance Level k = .50 k ? = .30 k 2 = .40 k 2 = .45 k„ = .49 
Number Tasks Funded 129 131 129 131 129 
Risk To lerance Level k = - .50 k = - .70 \a = - .60 k ? = - .55 k ? = - . 51 
Number Tasks Funded 139 143 142 141 139 
Risk Tolerance Level k = - 1 . 0 0 k ? = - 1 . 2 0 k ? = - 1 . 1 0 k ? = - 1 . 0 5 k? = - 1 . 0 1 
Number Tasks Funded 144 147 144 144 144 
Figure 9 . Abso lu te D i f f e r e n c e in k between Superordinate and Subordinate L e v e l s 
v s . the Sum of Abso lu te D i f f e r e n c e s between the R e s p e c t i v e P o r t f o l i o s 
c 
CO 
^ ! CO 




















These s e t s are d e f i n e d in Table 5 . 
Figure 10. D i f f e r e n c e i n Number of Tasks Funded by Superordinate and Subordinate L e v e l s 
v s . Abso lu te D i f f e r e n c e i n k between the R e s p e c t i v e L e v e l s 
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Table 7 . Risk Tolerance Fac tor S e t t i n g s 
Used t o Tes t Conjecture 3 
Run k i k 2 
1 1 .00 - 1 , 0 0 
2 - 1 . 0 0 1 .00 
3 .50 - , 50 
4 - . 50 .50 
5 . 10 - . 10 
6 - . 10 .10 
Table 8 . R e s u l t s from the Tes t of Conjecture 3 for Varying 
Superord inate Risk L e v e l s (k^) and Subordinate 
Risk L e v e l s ( k Q ) 
P o r t f o l i o 
Mean 




Sum of Abs. 
D i f f e r e n c e s 
k l • 1 .00 182663 48549 121 60430 
k 2 = - 1 . 0 0 183775 79478 146 
k l " - 1 . 0 0 185254 82138 146 63294 
k 2 = 1 .00 183055 50864 123 
k l = 
k 2 = 
. 50 








k l = 
k 2 = 









k l = .10 191724 63513 130 6320 
k 2 = - .10 191087 66575 134 
k l = - . 10 192087 67254 133 6660 
k 2 = . 10 190413 62426 131 
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a t a l l . They show t h a t the p o r t f o l i o s d i f f e r by a g r e a t e r amount when 
the b e n e f i t f u n c t i o n of the s u p e r o r d i n a t e l e v e l i s r i s k t o l e r a n t . Both 
the sum of a b s o l u t e d i f f e r e n c e s i n d e x and the p o r t f o l i o means and v a r i ­
ances s u g g e s t t h i s asymmetry of the p o r t f o l i o d i f f e r e n c e s . 
When the b e n e f i t f u n c t i o n ( o b j e c t i v e f u n c t i o n ) of the s u p e r o r d i n a t e 
l e v e l u s e s a r i s k i n t o l e r a n t r i s k p r o p e n s i t y , k > 0 , the r e s u l t i n g d i f f e r ­
ence between that p o r t f o l i o and the p o r t f o l i o s e l e c t e d by the m u l t i - l e v e l 
p r o c e s s u s i n g a r i s k t o l e r a n t subord inate i s always l e s s than the d i f f e r ­
ence between the p o r t f o l i o by a r i s k t o l e r a n t s u p e r o r d i n a t e b e n e f i t func­
t i o n and the p o r t f o l i o s e l e c t e d by a m u l t i - l e v e l p r o c e s s u s i n g a r i s k 
i n t o l e r a n t subord ina te b e n e f i t f u n c t i o n . The s i z e o f t h i s d i f f e r e n c e i s 
v e r y s m a l l . 
The funding c h a r a c t e r i s t i c s found and d i s c u s s e d in the f i r s t con­
j e c t u r e are found when the model r e p r e s e n t s a s i n g l e l e v e l d e c i s i o n p r o c e s s 
w i t h a r i s k a v e r s e b e n e f i t f u n c t i o n . R e c a l l from e a r l i e r in the chapter 
the s t e p s n e c e s s a r y to make the model r e p r e s e n t a m u l t i - l e v e l d e c i s i o n 
p r o c e s s , in p a r t i c u l a r , how the budgets ( c o n s t r a i n t s ) are c a l c u l a t e d . 
With the i m p o s i t i o n of t h e s e budgets upon the subord inate l e v e l , i t i s 
now forced to f ind t a s k s branch by branch. 
The communicated branch budgets are e i t h e r g r e a t e r than or l e s s 
than the budget t h a t would be expended by the subord ina te l e v e l w i t h i n 
t h a t branch had i t been u n c o n s t r a i n e d . I f t h i s communicated budget i s 
l a r g e r , the b e h a v i o r s which r e s u l t are then the same as i s d i s c u s s e d 
e a r l i e r i n t h i s c h a p t e r . The r i s k t o l e r a n t subord inate l e v e l tends to 
a l l o c a t e t h e s e a d d i t i o n a l monies to t a s k s which i t had not funded b e f o r e . 
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This o c c u r s because of the incrementa l b e n e f i t and r e l a t e s back to c o n j e c ­
t u r e 1 and the data u s e d . C o n v e r s e l y , when the communicated budget i s 
s m a l l e r , then the model again behaves as d i s c u s s e d e a r l i e r in t h i s chap­
t e r ; t h a t i s , t h a t the subord inate l e v e l w i l l f ind fewer t a s k s than i t 
would i f i t were u n c o n s t r a i n e d . 
However, when the r i s k t o l e r a n c e s of the l e v e l s are r e v e r s e d , 
t h a t i s , the s u p e r o r d i n a t e l e v e l i s r i s k t o l e r a n t and the subord ina te 
l e v e l i s r i s k i n t o l e r a n t , the model does no t behave i n p r e c i s e l y the same 
manner a l t h o u g h the same a l t e r n a t i v e s are a v a i l a b l e . In the case of a 
decremented budget , the model behaves in the same manner as above , fewer 
t a s k s are funded and some t a s k s are funded a t reduced l e v e l s . Under 
c o n d i t i o n s of incremented b u d g e t s , the model c h o o s e s i n c r e a s e d funding 
l e v e l s r a t h e r than fund a d d i t i o n a l t a s k s , when the r i s k t o l e r a n c e s are as 
s t a t e d . I t w i l l devo te most o f the a d d i t i o n a l funds to i n c r e a s i n g the 
funding l e v e l s o f t a s k s p r e v i o u s l y funded because o f the nature o f the 
b e n e f i t f u n c t i o n and the p r o p e r t i e s of the d a t a , a s d i s c u s s e d in con­
j e c t u r e 1. 
What has happened i s t h a t , when the s u p e r o r d i n a t e l e v e l u s e s a 
r i s k i n t o l e r a n t b e n e f i t f u n c t i o n and the subord inate l e v e l u s e s a r i s k 
t o l e r a n t b e n e f i t f u n c t i o n , the imposed budget caused the subord inate 
l e v e l t o fund more t a s k s than i t would have wi thout the budget imposed on 
i t from the s u p e r o r d i n a t e l e v e l . This i s a "net" f i g u r e a s in some 
branches fewer t a s k s were funded i n the c o n s t r a i n e d s i t u a t i o n than in the 
u n c o n s t r a i n e d s i t u a t i o n . The same s i t u a t i o n appears to occur when the 
s u p e r o r i d i n a t e l e v e l u s e s a r i s k t o l e r a n t b e n e f i t f u n c t i o n and the sub­
o r d i n a t e l e v e l u s e s a r i s k i n t o l e r a n t b e n e f i t f u n c t i o n . Because o f t a s k s 
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b e i n g added, funded a t i n c r e a s e d l e v e l s , d e l e t e d , or funded a t d e c r e a s e d 
l e v e l s , and some p e c u l i a r i t y o f the data u s e d , the d i f f e r e n c e s in the p o r t ­
f o l i o s when the s u p e r o r d i n a t e l e v e l u s e s a r i s k - i n t o l e r a n t b e n e f i t func ­
t i o n and the subord inate l e v e l u s e s a r i s k t o l e r a n t b e n e f i t f u n c t i o n are 
l e s s than the correspond ing d i f f e r e n c e s found when the s u p e r o r d i n a t e l e v e l 
u s e s a r i s k t o l e r a n t b e n e f i t f u n c t i o n and the subord inate l e v e l u s e s a 
r i s k i n t o l e r a n t b e n e f i t f u n c t i o n . These d i f f e r e n c e s are s l i g h t and taken 
w i t h the o t h e r i n d i c e s used i n d i c a t e no p a r t i c u l a r t r e n d . Thus the r e ­
s u l t s do no t support the c o n j e c t u r e , but no c l e a r trend was found. 
Another i n s i g h t can be ga ined from the data p r e s e n t e d in Table 8 . 
In every c a s e p r e s e n t e d i n t h i s t a b l e , the v a r i a n c e of the m u l t i - l e v e l 
p o r t f o l i o i s c h a r a c t e r i s t i c of the r i s k t o l e r a n c e of the subord ina te 
l e v e l , i . e . , the subord inate l e v e l i n the m u l t i - l e v e l d e c i s i o n p r o c e s s i s 
c o n t r o l l i n g the r i s k i n e s s of the f i n a l p o r t f o l i o . In t h i s s e n s e , r i s k i ­
n e s s w i l l be equaled to a h igher v a r i a n c e ; so the h i g h e r the p o r t f o l i o 
v a r i a n c e , the more r i s k y the p o r t f o l i o . While the v a r i a n c e s r e p r e s e n t the 
c h a r a c t e r i s t i c of the subord ina te l e v e l ' s r i s k t o l e r a n c e , the means of the 
m u l t i - l e v e l p o r t f o l i o s have remained c o n s i s t e n t w i t h t h o s e of the super­
o r d i n a t e l e v e l p o r t f o l i o s . S ince i t i s the subord ina te l e v e l which i s 
a c t u a l l y s e l e c t i n g the t a s k s in the m u l t i - l e v e l d e c i s i o n p r o c e s s , i t 
seems o n l y r e a s o n a b l e to expec t the s e l e c t e d p o r t f o l i o to r e f l e c t the 
r i s k t o l e r a n c e of t h i s subord inate l e v e l . 
The l a s t c o n j e c t u r e i n v e s t i g a t e d was the most i n t e r e s t i n g ; the 
r e s u l t s o b t a i n e d were the most s u r p r i s i n g . This c o n j e c t u r e d e a l s w i t h 
the i m p o s i t i o n of budgetary c o n s t r a i n t s by the s u p e r o r d i n a t e l e v e l on the 
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s u b o r d i n a t e l e v e l i n order to c o n t r o l the a c t i o n s of the s u b o r d i n a t e . 
The c o n j e c t u r e says t h a t the i m p o s i t i o n of t h e s e c o n s t r a i n t s upon the 
s u b o r d i n a t e l e v e l w i l l cause the subord ina te l e v e l to s e l e c t a p o r t f o l i o 
more in l i n e w i t h t h a t d e s i r e d by the s u p e r o r d i n a t e l e v e l than he would 
do were the subord ina te l e v e l l e f t u n c o n s t r a i n e d . This s tudy on ly looks 
a t the e x t e n s i o n of t h e s e c o n s t r a i n t s to the p r o j e c t l e v e l . 
Budgetary c o n s t r a i n t s are not extended to the t a s k l e v e l b e c a u s e , 
i f the funding o f the s u p e r o r d i n a t e l e v e l were imposed on every t a s k f o r 
the s u b o r d i n a t e l e v e l , then the subord inate l e v e l would have a b s o l u t e l y 
no o p t i o n , no m a t t e r how d i f f e r e n t i t s b e n e f i t f u n c t i o n might be from 
t h a t o f the s u p e r o r d i n a t e l e v e l , o t h e r than to e x a c t l y d u p l i c a t e the p o r t ­
f o l i o and funding p a t t e r n of the s u p e r o r d i n a t e l e v e l . However, r a t h e r 
than pass from s u p e r o r d i n a t e l e v e l to subord ina te l e v e l , a s p e c i f i c 
budgetary c o n s t r a i n t , a range cou ld be passed from the h i g h e r l e v e l to the 
lower l e v e l i n s t e a d . The e f f e c t s of u s i n g a range f o r the budgetary c o n ­
s t r a i n t s are not known; however, t h e s e e f f e c t s would be r e l a t e d to the 
s i z e o f the range u s e d . This type of c o n s t r a i n t was not u s e d . 
The r e s u l t s do not lend support to t h i s h y p o t h e s i s a t the p r o j e c t 
l e v e l . In some i n s t a n c e s , the a d d i t i o n a l c o n s t r a i n t s d id br ing the p o r t ­
f o l i o s c l o s e r t o g e t h e r ( s e e Table 9 ) . In o t h e r i n s t a n c e s , the added 
budgetary c o n s t r a i n t s had no e f f e c t on the d i f f e r e n c e between the p o r t ­
f o l i o s , n e i t h e r moving them c l o s e r t o g e t h e r nor f a r t h e r apart ( s e e Table 
10). F i n a l l y , in the remaining c a s e s , the a d d i t i o n a l c o n s t r a i n t s a c t u a l l y 
caused the d i f f e r e n c e between the p o r t f o l i o s to i n c r e a s e ( s e e Table 11). 
An o p e r a t i o n a l r u l e was used to d e c i d e i n t o which c a t e g o r y t h e s e p o r t -
Table 9. Results In which Additional Constraints Imposed at the Project Level Caused the Portfolios to Become More Alike 
Subordinate Portfolios 
Superordinate Portfolio Branch Constraints Project Constraints 
kl k2 Mean Variance No. 
Funded 
Sum of Abs. Dif. Mean Variance No. 
Funded 
Sum of 
Abs. Dif. Mean Variance No. Funded 
.50 1.00 190952 58620 129 24620 182998 50245 123 19482 181544 50484 127 
.10 1.00 191724 63513 130 38844 183758 50952 122 30928 180364 50288 124 
.10 .50 191724 63513 130 1498S 189574 58407 128 11428 186352 58129 129 
.10 - .10 191724 63513 130 6320 191087 66575 134 4678 187170 64363 134 
.10 -1.00 191724 63513 130 33246 183849 80726 146 31240 178029 76350 145 
- .10 1.00 192087 67254 133 44346 184267 50916 122 38846 180750 51208 128 
- .10 .10 192087 67254 133 6660 190413 62426 131 6000 191223 64352 133 
- .10 -1.00 192087 67254 133 26074 184131 79959 143 25546 183620 79479 149 
- .50 1.00 189952 74705 139 55168 183917 50418 122 48626 180487 49809 128 
- .50 - .10 189952 74705 139 15452 191195 65774 134 12170 190477 67848 137 
-1.00 - .10 184254 81717 144 28764 190424 66703 134 25747 187074 66931 138 
1.00 - .50 184254 81717 144 13960 188813 75030 140 12163 185927 75040 144 
Tab le 1 0 . Resu l ts i n which the A d d i t i o n a l C o n s t r a i n t s a t the P r o j e c t L e v e l Had No E f f e c t on the D i f f e r e n c e between the P o r t f o l i o s 
Subordinate P o r t f o l i o s 
Superord ina te P o r t f o l i o Branch C o n s t r a i n t s Only Imposed Branch and P r o j e c t C o n s t r a i n t s 
Imposed 
k l k 2 
Mean Var iance No. 
Funded 
Sum o f 
Abs. D i f . 
Mean V a r i a n c e No. 
Funded 
Sum o f 
Abs. D i f . 
Mean V a r i a n c e No. 
Funded 
1.00 - . 10 182663 48549 120 45548 190772 66768 137 45449 187430 67765 135 
.50 - .10 190960 58319 129 21949 191084 66402 134 21920 189725 67508 137 
. 50 - .50 190960 58319 129 32200 189615 73631 141 32200 189615 73631 140 
- . 50 - 1 . 0 0 189952 74705 139 13316 181744 79237 146 13316 181744 79237 147 
- 1 . 0 0 1 .00 185254 82138 144 60197 180969 52414 124 60197 180969 52414 126 
- 1 . 0 0 . 50 184254 81717 144 46177 186760 58052 129 46177 286760 53052 131 
- 1 . 0 0 . 10 184254 81717 144 35408 190013 63962 131 35408 190013 63962 134 
Table 1 1 . Resu l ts i n which the A d d i t i o n a l C o n s t r a i n t s a t the P r o j e c t L e v e l Caused the D i f f e r e n c e between the P o r t f o l i o s to I n c r e a s e 
Subordinate P o r t f o l i o s 
Superord ina te P o r t f o l i o Branch C o n s t r a i n t s P r o j e c t C o n s t r a i n s t 
k. k Mean Var iance No. Sum o f Mean V a r i a n c e No. Sum o f Mean Var iance No. 
1 2 Funded Abs. D i f . Funded Abs. D i f . Funded 
1 00 .50 182663 43549 120 21366 189527 57044 129 25093 185403 58014 130 
1 00 .10 182663 48549 120 33406 190952 62992 132 40365 187713 61981 132 
1 .00 - .50 182663 48549 120 54952 188632 73339 139 56417 184873 72851 143 
1 .00 - 1 . 0 0 182663 43549 120 60430 183775 79478 146 61451 182871 77691 148 
.50 .10 190960 58319 129 12328 191435 62570 132 14875 187954 64612 135 
.50 - 1 . 0 0 190960 58319 129 42476 184131 79752 145 43568 181233 78273 148 
.10 - .50 191724 63513 130 18214 189433 74585 140 19528 185476 73350 138 
.10 .50 192037 67254 133 21220 189365 58214 130 22090 188260 58747 131 
.10 - .50 192087 67254 133 14203 188236 74053 142 14768 186799 73822 140 
.50 .50 189952 74705 139 32940 189384 58543 129 34124 188233 53477 134 




f o l i o s would be c l a s s i f i e d . The measure used was the sum of a b s o l u t e 
d i f f e r e n c e s . I f the sum of a b s o l u t e d i f f e r e n c e s d e c r e a s e d by 200 or 
more, then the a d d i t i o n a l c o n s t r a i n t s were s a i d to be e f f e c t i v e . As can 
be seen i n Table 9 , the sum of a b s o l u t e d i f f e r e n c e s d e c r e a s e d from a 
minimum of 239 to a maximum of 4376 . The a d d i t i o n a l c o n s t r a i n t s were 
c o n s i d e r e d to be i n e f f e c t i v e i f they produced a change of l e s s than 200 
in the sum of a b s o l u t e d i f f e r e n c e s . In Table 10 , i t can be observed 
t h a t the minimum change was 0 and the maximum was 9 9 . To be c l a s s i f i e d 
as i n c r e a s i n g the d i f f e r e n c e i n the p o r t f o l i o s , the i m p o s i t i o n of a d d i ­
t i o n a l c o n s t r a i n t s had to i n c r e a s e the sum of a b s o l u t e d i f f e r e n c e s by a t 
l e a s t 200 . The changes in t h i s measure ranged from a minimum of 560 to 
a maximum of 3727 as can be seen in Table 1 1 . More s p e c i f i c a l l y , there 
were 12 c a s e s i n which the a d d i t i o n a l c o n s t r a i n t s had the e f f e c t of 
moving the p o r t f o l i o s i n t o c l o s e r agreement , 7 c a s e s in which t h e s e con­
s t r a i n t s had no e f f e c t , and 11 c a s e s in which the c o n s t r a i n t s had the 
e f f e c t of d e c r e a s i n g the agreement between the p o r t f o l i o s . 
These r e s u l t s were q u i t e unexpec ted; however, a f t e r c a r e f u l c o n ­
s i d e r a t i o n , i t becomes l o g i c a l for the model to behave in the observed 
manner. As d i s c u s s e d e a r l i e r in the c h a p t e r , each u n i t w i t h i n the sub­
o r d i n a t e for which the s u p e r o r d i n a t e communicates a budget becomes a 
s e p a r a t e d e c i s i o n problem. I f branch budgets are communicated, then each 
branch must be funded s e p a r a t e l y ; i f p r o j e c t budgets are communicated, 
then each p r o j e c t must be funded i n d i v i d u a l l y . The funding of each branch 
or p r o j e c t becomes an independent d e c i s i o n problem. The behav ior p o s s i b l e 
when t h e s e budgets are s p e c i f i e d by the s u p e r o r d i n a t e i s d i s c u s s e d in 
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d e t a i l e a r l i e r in the c h a p t e r . Within each p r o j e c t , t h e r e w i l l e i t h e r 
be a d d i t i o n a l t a s k s funded and/or t a s k s w i l l have t h e i r funding l e v e l s 
i n c r e a s e d or fewer t a s k s w i l l be funded and/or t a s k s w i l l have t h e i r 
funding l e v e l s reduced . These b e h a v i o r s can have p o s s i b l e e f f e c t s on 
the d i f f e r e n c e between the p o r t f o l i o s : they can d e c r e a s e the d i f f e r e n c e 
between them; they can i n c r e a s e the d i f f e r e n c e between them; or they can 
have no e f f e c t on the p o r t f o l i o s . These e f f e c t s can be noted in a pro ­
j e c t by p r o j e c t comparison . 
The ne t e f f e c t on the d i f f e r e n c e between the o v e r a l l p o r t f o l i o s 
i s the sum of the net e f f e c t s on the i n d i v i d u a l p r o j e c t s . An example of 
the e f f e c t s o f impos ing p r o j e c t c o n s t r a i n t s i s p r e s e n t e d to i l l u s t r a t e 
the above procedure . 
Let us say we have on ly two p r o j e c t s and f i v e t a s k s w i t h i n each 
p r o j e c t . Let us l a b e l t h e s e t a s k s as f o l l o w s : 
ta sk i j 
where i = the p r o j e c t to which the task b e l o n g s and j i n d i c a t e s the number 
of t h a t t a s k w i t h i n the p r o j e c t . Now l e t us assume t h a t the s u p e r o r d i n a t e 
l e v e l s e l e c t s the f o l l o w i n g t a s k s for h i s p o r t f o l i o a t the f o l l o w i n g fund­
ing l e v e l s : 
Branch 1 8000 
P r o j e c t 1 5000 
Task 11 1000 
Task 13 500 
Task 14 2000 
Task 15 1500 
P r o j e c t 2 3000 
Task 21 1000 
Task 24 2000 
Let us now say t h a t the s u b o r d i n a t e , a c t i n g under on ly branch c o n s t r a i n t s , 
s e l e c t s and f i n d s a p o r t f o l i o as f o l l o w s : 
Branch 8000 
P r o j e c t 1 2300 
Task 11 800 
Task 12 500 
Task 15 1000 
P r o j e c t 2 5700 
Task 21 1000 
Task 22 1203 
Task 23 1000 
Task 24 1100 
Task 25 1400 
This c a u s e s a sum of a b s o l u t e d i f f e r e n c e s of 7700. 
Now l e t us assume t h a t , under p r o j e c t c o n s t r a i n t s , the subord inate l e v e l 
s e l e c t s and funds h i s p o r t f o l i o as f o l l o w s : 
Branch 8000 
P r o j e c t 1 5000 
Task 11 800 
Task 12 500 
Task 14 2000 
Task 15 1300 
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P r o j e c t 2 3000 
Task 22 1400 
Task 25 1600 
This p o r t f o l i o w i l l have a sum of a b s o l u t e d i f f e r e n c e s of 7500 . 
Hence, the a d d i t i o n a l c o n s t r a i n t s have had the d e s i r e d e f f e c t . However, 
we c o u l d have had a subord inate l e v e l t h a t s e l e c t e d and funded the f o l l o w ­
i n g p o r t f o l i o under the added p r o j e c t c o n s t r a i n t s : 
Branch 8000 
P r o j e c t i—>
 
5000 
Task 11 800 
Task 12 500 
Task 13 2000 
Task 15 1700 
P r o j e c t 2 3000 
Task 22 1400 
Task 25 1600 
This p o r t f o l i o d i f f e r s from the s u p e r o r d i n a t e l e v e l p o r t f o l i o w i t h a sum 
of a b s o l u t e d i f f e r e n c e s equa l to 1 0 , 4 0 0 . Thus, the a d d i t i o n a l c o n s t r a i n t s 
caused the p o r t f o l i o s to become more d i s s i m i l a r r a t h e r than s i m i l a r . 
Tables 1 2 , 1 3 , 14 , 15 , 16 , and 17 p r e s e n t the r e s u l t s for each 
l e v e l of s u p e r o r d i n a t e r i s k t o l e r a n c e . These r e s u l t s g i v e no i n d i c a t i o n 
under which a d d i t i o n of p r o j e c t budgets to the subord inate l e v e l in the 
m u l t i - l e v e l d e c i s i o n p r o c e s s w i l l cause the p o r t f o l i o s to become more 
s i m i l a r . The o n l y i n d i c a t i o n of any s o r t o f trend comes from Tables 9 , 
10 , and 1 1 . Here i t i s shown t h a t , in 7 3 . 5 percent o f the c a s e s looked 
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Table 12 . Sum of Abso lu te D i f f e r e n c e s and Number of Tasks Funded 
f o r k^ = 1 .00 and Varying Values o f k2 and for D i f f e r e n t 
C o n s t r a i n t C o n d i t i o n s 
k 1 = 1 .00 Branch C o n s t r a i n t s P r o j e c t C o n s t r a i n t s 
k 0 Sum Abs. No. Tasks Sum Abs. No. Tasks 
z D i f f e r e n c e s Funded D i f f e r e n c e s Funded 
.50 21366 129 25093 130 
. 10 38406 132 40365 132 
- . 10 45548 137 45449 135 
- .50 54952 139 56417 143 
- 1 . 0 0 60430 146 61451 148 
Superord inate Funds 120 
Table 13 . Sum of Abso lu te D i f f e r e n c e s and Number of Tasks Funded 
f o r k-̂  = 0 . 5 0 and Varying Values o f k2 and f o r D i f f e r e n t 
C o n s t r a i n t C o n d i t i o n s 
k n = .50 Branch C o n s t r a i n t s P r o j e c t C o n s t r a i n t s 
k 0 Sum Abs. No. Tasks Sum Abs. No. Tasks 
z D i f f e r e n c e s Funded D i f f e r e n c e s Funded 
1 .00 24620 123 19482 127 
.10 12328 132 14875 135 
- .10 21949 134 21920 137 
- . 50 32200 141 32200 140 
- 1 . 0 0 42476 145 43568 148 
Superordinate Funds 129 
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Table 14. Sum of Abso lute D i f f e r e n c e s and Number of Tasks Funded 
for k-̂  = 0 . 1 0 and Varying Values of k2 and f o r D i f f e r e n t 
C o n s t r a i n t C o n d i t i o n s 
k x = .10 Branch C o n s t r a i n t s P r o j e c t C o n s t r a i n t s 
k 2 Sum Abs. 




D i f f e r e n c e s 
No. Tasks 
Funded 
1.00 38844 122 30928 124 
.50 14988 128 11428 129 
- .10 6320 124 4768 133 
- . 50 18214 140 19528 138 





Table 15 . Sum o f Abso lute D i f f e r e n c e s and Number of Tasks 
f o r k-̂  = - 0 . 1 0 and Varying Values o f k 2 and for 
C o n s t r a i n t C o n d i t i o n s 
Funded 
D i f f e r e n t 
k - - .10 Branch C o n s t r a i n t s P r o j e c t C o n s t r a i n t s 
k 2 Sum Ab s . 
D i f f e r e n c e s 
No. Tasks 
Funded 
Sum Ab s , 
D i f f e r e n c e s 
No. Tasks 
Funded 
1.00 44346 122 38846 128 
.50 21220 130 22090 131 
.10 6660 131 6000 133 
- . 50 14208 142 14768 140 
- 1 . 0 0 26074 143 25546 149 
Superord inate Funds 133 
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Table 16 . Sum of Abso lu te D i f f e r e n c e s and Number of Tasks Funded 
f o r k-̂  = - 0 . 5 0 and Varying Values of k2 and for D i f f e r e n t 
C o n s t r a i n t C o n d i t i o n s 
k x = - .50 Branch C o n s t r a i n t s P r o j e c t C o n s t r a i n t s 
k 2 Sum Abs. D i f f e r e n c e s 
No. Tasks 
Funded 
Sum Ab s . 
D i f f e r e n c e s 
No. Tasks 
Funded 
1.00 55168 122 48626 128 
.50 32940 129 34124 134 
. 10 18856 131 19788 134 
- . 10 15452 134 12170 137 





Table 17. Sum of Abso lu te D i f f e r e n c e s and Number of Tasks 
for k^ = - 1 . 0 0 and Varying Values of k£ and for 
C o n s t r a i n t C o n d i t i o n s 
Funded 
D i f f e r e n t 
k x = - 1 . 0 0 Branch C o n s t r a i n t s P r o j e c t C o n s t r a i n t s 




D i f f e r e n c e s 
No. Tasks 
Funded 
1.00 60197 124 60197 126 
.50 46177 129 46177 131 
.10 35408 131 35408 134 
- .10 28764 134 25747 138 
- .50 13960 140 12163 144 
Superordinate Funds 144 
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at i n the s u p e r o r d i n a t e l e v e l , r i s k t o l e r a n c e was n e g a t i v e . The a d d i t i o n 
o f p r o j e c t budget s caused the p o r t f o l i o s to become more a l i k e or d id no t 
cause them to become more d i s s i m i l a r . In 66 .7 p e r c e n t o f the c a s e s in 
which the s u p e r o r d i n a t e l e v e l r i s k t o l e r a n c e was p o s i t i v e , the a d d i t i o n 
of p r o j e c t budgets caused the p o r t f o l i o s to become more d i s s i m i l a r or not 
to become more s i m i l a r . The reason for t h i s behav ior i s an e x c e l l e n t 
q u e s t i o n which must s t i l l be answered. 
Summary 
This chapter p r e s e n t s the four c o n j e c t u r e s t e s t e d and the r e s u l t s 
o f t h e s e t e s t s . Two of t h e s e c o n j e c t u r e s dea l w i t h s i n g l e l e v e l d e c i s i o n 
p r o c e s s e s and two w i t h m u l t i - l e v e l d e c i s i o n p r o c e s s e s . The most impor­
t a n t r e s u l t o b t a i n e d was t h a t the i m p o s i t i o n of a d d i t i o n a l c o n s t r a i n t s 
d id not n e c e s s a r i l y cause the p o r t f o l i o s to become more s i m i l a r . This 
t e n t a t i v e r e s u l t a long w i t h the o t h e r t e n t a t i v e c o n c l u s i o n s , i s an a t ­
tempt to ga in i n s i g h t i n t o m u l t i - l e v e l d e c i s i o n p r o c e s s e s . Further 
i n s i g h t s are s t i l l to be found and the emphasis o f f u t u r e r e s e a r c h should 
be to ga in f u r t h e r i n s i g h t s and to i n v e s t i g a t e the t e n t a t i v e c o n c l u s i o n s 
p r e s e n t e d i n t h i s work in much g r e a t e r d e t a i l . 
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CHAPTER VI 
CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
C o n c l u s i o n s 
The purpose of t h i s r e s e a r c h was to examine some p a r t i c u l a r a s p e c t s 
of the m u l t i - l e v e l d e c i s i o n p r o c e s s in an R & D environment . To t h i s end, 
four s p e c i f i c c o n j e c t u r e s were examined. Through the examinat ion of t h e s e 
c o n j e c t u r e s , c e r t a i n t e n t a t i v e i n s i g h t s were r e a c h e d . 
These i n s i g h t s can be c l a s s i f i e d i n t o two c a t e g o r i e s , those d e a l ­
i n g w i t h s i n g l e - l e v e l d e c i s i o n p r o c e s s e s and those d e a l i n g w i t h m u l t i ­
l e v e l d e c i s i o n p r o c e s s e s . The s i n g l e - l e v e l d e c i s i o n p r o c e s s i n s i g h t s 
a r e : 
1. The number o f t a s k s funded by a d e c i s i o n maker i s a f u n c t i o n 
of t h a t d e c i s i o n maker's r i s k t o l e r a n c e . I t was f u r t h e r found t h a t the 
more r i s k t o l e r a n t a d e c i s i o n maker, the g r e a t e r would be the number of 
t a s k s he s e l e c t e d for fund ing . 
2 . The e x p e c t e d v a l u e (mean) o f the s e l e c t e d p o r t f o l i o was not 
symmetr ica l about k=0. The reasons for t h i s asymmetric behav ior are not 
r e a d i l y apparent and need to be i n v e s t i g a t e d i n g r e a t e r d e t a i l . 
The l a s t two t e n t a t i v e i n s i g h t s concern m u l t i - l e v e l d e c i s i o n pro ­
c e s s e s . These are f a s c i n a t i n g and w h i l e the trend appears in t h i s work, 
c e r t a i n l y more d e t a i l e d and e x t e n s i v e i n v e s t i g a t i o n o f t h e s e t rends i s 
needed . S p e c i f i c a l l y , more d e t a i l e d knowledge i s n e c e s s a r y about c o n j e e -
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t u r e 4 , the most unexpected r e s u l t ach ieved in t h i s r e s e a r c h . The t e n t a ­
t i v e m u l t i - l e v e l i n s i g h t s d e r i v e d a r e : 
3 . The d i f f e r e n c e between the s u p e r o r d i n a t e l e v e l ' s p o r t f o l i o 
and the p o r t f o l i o s e l e c t e d by a m u l t i - l e v e l p r o c e s s i s symmetrical about 
4 . The i m p o s i t i o n of a d d i t i o n a l c o n s t r a i n t s upon the subord inate 
l e v e l by the s u p e r o r d i n a t e l e v e l w i l l not n e c e s s a r i l y cause the super ­
o r d i n a t e l e v e l ' s p o r t f o l i o and the s u p e r o r d i n a t e - s u b o r d i n a t e l e v e l ' s 
p o r t f o l i o t o become more a l i k e . 
Recommendations 
This r e s e a r c h has b a r e l y begun to s c r a t c h the s u r f a c e o f a v e r y 
l a r g e and complex a r e a . I t has i d e n t i f i e d some t e n t a t i v e i n s i g h t s in t h i s 
area and a l s o i n d i c a t e d o t h e r a r e a s where f u r t h e r r e s e a r c h i s c a l l e d f o r . 
The work p r e s e n t e d in t h i s paper i s fundamental ly of an e x p l o r a t o r y 
n a t u r e . Some o f the s p e c i f i c areas i n which f u r t h e r work i s n e c e s s a r y 
a r e : 
1. The e f f e c t s o f f a c t o r s o t h e r than r i s k t o l e r a n c e upon the 
m u l t i - l e v e l d e c i s i o n p r o c e s s . 
2 . More d e t a i l e d i n v e s t i g a t i o n i n t o the asymmetry property i n d i ­
c a t e d in c o n j e c t u r e 2 . 
3 . Further work on the compos i t ion of a d d i t i o n a l ( o t h e r than 
branch) c o n s t r a i n t s from s u p e r o r d i n a t e to subord ina te in order t o a c h i e v e 
s i m i l a r i t y in p o r t f o l i o s e l e c t i o n ; the p r e c i s e c o n d i t i o n s under which 
t h i s s t r a t e g y w i l l be s u c c e s s f u l and when i t w i l l not need to be i d e n t i ­
f i e d . 
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4 . Work in t h i s same area making d i f f e r e n t assumpt ions about the 
d a t a , or u s i n g r e a l l i f e data to s e e i f the data have b i a s e d any of the 
r e s u l t s . 
Hence, one can s e e t h a t t h e r e i s a l a r g e v a r i e t y o f problems 
w i t h i n t h i s r e s e a r c h area which c a l l s for i n t e n s i v e i n v e s t i g a t i o n . I t 
i s on ly when a l l t h e s e i n v e s t i g a t i o n s are completed t h a t we w i l l be a b l e 
to answer some of the q u e s t i o n s which t h i s and o ther works are now b e ­
g i n n i n g to r a i s e . 
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